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Abstract
The empirical literature in international macroeconomics and finance reveals
a growing interest in the use of nonlinear models. Their attractiveness is clear,
as these models allow capturing discontinuity in the data-generating process and,
by estimating endogenously transition probabilities and variables, avoid the a priori
identification of regimes and their timing, thereby enhancing the extent of flexibility
in the analysis. This thesis makes use of nonlinear techniques in order to model two
different economic issues, which have been at the centre of the economic debate in
the last years.
The first analysis refers to the issue of debt sustainability and, in particular,
tries to test empirically some of the leading interpretations that have been advanced
to account for the financial turmoil that characterised the run-up to the Brazilian
presidential elections in 2002. We test for financial contagion from the Argentine
crisis and the impact of factors including IMF intervention and political uncertainty
in raising the probability of crisis. The empirical investigation employs a Markov-
switching model with endogenous transition probabilities.
The second part of the thesis is devoted to the analysis of current account
imbalances in G7 countries. We find evidence of threshold behaviour in current
account adjustment, such that the dynamics of adjustment towards equilibrium de-
pend upon whether the current-account/ net-output ratio breaches estimated country
specific current account surplus or deficit thresholds. Both the speeds of adjustment
and the size of the thresholds are found to differ significantly across countries. We
complement the univariate analysis by disentangling the domestic components of
the current account according to the national income identity with a view to shed
light on the role of savings (both public and private) and investment. Evidence of
shifts in means and variances of exchange rate changes - that coincide with the cur-
rent account adjustment regimes identified by the model - suggest scope for further
research on the role of the real exchange rate in determining the nonlinear behav-
iour of the current account. We extend the threshold methodology to a bivariate
context and find evidence of a strict link between current account adjustments and
deviations of a country real exchange rate from its long run equilibrium, such that
beyond a certain appreciation/depreciation of the real exchange rate, a country CA
imbalance would start reverting towards its mean value. Finally, we run a nonlinear
test of the present value model of the current account, encouraged by the evidence
of nonlinear adjustment in the current account. However, in line with the literature,
we reject the test for all countries also in this new nonlinear framework.
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
The use of nonlinear models in time series analysis has become increasingly pop-
ular over the last decade. Their attractiveness in the analysis of issues in international
macroeconomics and finance is clear, as these models allow to capture discontinuity in
the data-generating process, in the form of regime changes due to a structural alteration in
the economic system as well as extraordinary short-period events such as a financial cri-
sis. Moreover, by estimating endogenously transition probabilities and variables, nonlinear
models avoid the a priori identification of regimes and their timing, thereby enhancing the
extent of flexibility in the analysis. Given these attractive features, it is not surprising that
the empirical literature in international macroeconomics reveals a growing interest in the
use of this category of models.
This thesis makes use of nonlinear techniques in order to model two different eco-
nomic issues, which have been at the centre of the economic debate in the last years.
The first analysis refers to the issue of debt sustainability in emerging markets and,
in particular, tries to test empirically some of the leading interpretations that have been
advanced to account for the Brazilian financial turmoil in 2002. In the run-up to the pres-
idential elections, a strong currency depreciation and a sudden and sharp rise in sovereign
1
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bond spreads put Brazil under strain, by severely impacting upon its indexed debt, despite
the important reforms of the previous years and the relative sound fundamentals.
The nature of the topic requires a methodology able to account for the existence of
unobservable factors (such as changes in investors’ beliefs, herding behaviour, financial
panic and political uncertainty) that are likely to affect the process under investigation.
Markov-switching (MS) models with endogenous transition probabilities prove a valuable
tool for the purposes of modeling regime shifts. In effect, the possibility of capturing self-
fulfilling changes in market behaviour, by means of an endogenous regime-shift selection,
allows researchers to test multiple equilibria models empirically.
The fact that the crisis occurred during the electoral campaign, coupled with the con-
cerns expressed by some financial commentators relating to the expected victory of the so-
cialist candidate, Lula da Silva, a former trade unionist known for his past declarations on
debt repudiation, led several authors to interpret the Brazilian experience as a financial dis-
tress episode triggered by uncertainty on the political outcome. In the analysis we therefore
assess the existence of a political “mistrust effect” for the left-wing candidate on the coun-
try default risk by means of an opinion polls variable. In light of the literature on catalytic
finance, we also address the role of IMF intervention on investor sentiment, by creating an
IMF dummy variable including both positive and negative news from the IMF or domestic
politicians. We test for both financial and political contagion between Argentina and Brazil
by extending the analysis to Argentine data. Finally, we account for a global factor effect
by introducing into the empirical model the high-yield spread in developed markets.
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The second part of the thesis is devoted to the analysis of sustainability and adjust-
ment of current account imbalances in G7 countries, a subject that has been receiving con-
siderable attention among policymakers, financial market practitioners and academics. At
more than 6 percent of GDP, the US current account deficit attracts the most focus, but there
are also material current account imbalances in other deficit countries such as the UK and
in surplus countries such as Japan and Germany. The question at the heart of the present
analysis is whether or not the stationary stochastic process which describes the current ac-
count to net output ratio in the G7 countries features linear or nonlinear adjustment to the
unconditional mean. We identify threshold autoregressive models as tractable and testable
nonlinear time series models that conveniently exhibit all of the features of the current ac-
count adjustment process that have been the focus of recent discussions in the literature,
and that nest as a special case the linear stationary stochastic process model for the current
account that is often assumed in empirical work.
In Chapter 3, we estimate for each G7 country an univariate threshold autoregressive
model of the current account to net output ratio, allowing for country-specific thresholds of
current account surplus and deficit adjustment in each country, and also allowing for coun-
try specific means for the ratio of the current account to net output. We then investigate
what happens to the probability distributions of nominal exchange rate changes, stock price
index changes, and long term interest rate differentials during the various current account
adjustment regimes. The motivation is to determine whether or not crossing the current ac-
count adjustment threshold is itself associated with shifts in the probability distributions for
exchange rates, stock prices, and interest differentials. Finally, we draw on our empirical
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results to take stock of the present US current account deficit, characterised by relatively
wide thresholds within which current account adjustment is absent and by relatively slow
speeds of adjustment once these thresholds, especially the deficit threshold, are crossed.
We explore possible unusual circumstances, which might have delayed the US current ac-
count adjustment and that were not in evidence during the sample over which the models
were estimated, 1979-2003.
Chapter 4 complements the univariate results on current account adjustment by pro-
viding a disaggregated nonlinear analysis of its domestic components according to the na-
tional income identity. After investigating stilysed facts on the current degree of interna-
tional capital mobility and the robustness of the assumption of Ricardian equivalence, we
highlight the different role of savings and investment on current account adjustments in G7
countries.
In Chapter 5, we attempt at providing a comprehensive explanation of the joint dy-
namics of real exchange rate and current account, in particular of the role of the real ex-
change rate in determining the nonlinear adjustment of the current account. Our analysis
builds on the vast literature on the existence of nonlinearities in the dynamics of the real
exchange rate as well as on the preliminary evidence provided in chapter 3 of statistically
significant shifts in the mean and variance of the probability distribution of exchange rates
that occurred in conjunction with current account adjustment regimes. By extending the
threshold autoregressive methodology to a bivariate context, we find evidence of a strict
link between current account adjustments and deviations of a country real exchange rate
from its long run equilibrium, such that beyond a certain appreciation/depreciation level
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of the real exchange rate, a country CA imbalance would start reverting towards its mean
value.
Chapter 6 reports research on a nonlinear test of the present value model of the current
account. We estimate a multivariate system for current account, net output, world real
interest rate and real exchange rate, allowing for a threshold adjustment in the current
account and exchange rate variables, and compute forecasts of these variables over a finite
sample, as suggested by the speed of adjustment of their temporary components. The
evidence on the threshold behaviour of the current account and on the significant effect of
the real exchange rate on its adjustment, as presented in the previous chapters, seemed to
support this type of methodology. Nevertheless, in our analysis of the intertemporal model
of the current account, the predictive power of our forecasts remain highly unsatisfactory.
Chapter 2
The Brazilian Currency Turmoil of 2002: A
Nonlinear Analysis
2.1 Introduction
During the last decade or so, a number of Latin American countries experienced severe fi-
nancial and currency crises, from Mexico in 1994 to Argentina in 2001. Debt sustainability
problems have been a crucial issue in all of these episodes of distress. Even when a coun-
try’s foreign debt exposure was relatively low, the structure of its sovereign bonds made it
vulnerable to speculative attack or any other financial market turbulence. In the spring of
2002, a strong currency depreciation and a sudden and sharp rise in sovereign bond spreads
put Brazil under strain, by severely impacting upon its indexed debt, despite the important
reforms of the previous years and the relative sound fundamentals.
The financial turmoil generated by the change in the economic environment appeared
to be the result of a shift in market equilibria, from stability to crisis. The fact that the cri-
sis occurred in the run-up to the Brazilian presidential elections in October 2002, coupled
with the concerns expressed by some financial commentators relating to the expected vic-
tory of the socialist candidate, Lula da Silva, a former trade unionist known for his past
declarations on debt repudiation, has led authors such as Williamson (2002) to interpret the
Brazilian experience as a financial distress episode triggered by uncertainty on the political
outcome. In contrast, very little attention has been devoted to the contemporaneous crisis
6
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in Argentina as a possible explanation of the Brazilian turmoil. The Argentine debt crisis
has been mainly regarded as an entirely predictable and independent event, unable to in-
fluence the other economies of the region apart from marginal financial spillovers1. Some
authors – e.g. Miller et al. (2003) – have, however, suggested a role for the Argentine crisis
and, more generally, of its underlying political events in coordinating public expectations
concerning the behavior of a possible left-wing government in Brazil.
This chapter aims to investigate the events of 2002 in Brazil, by testing empirically
some of the interpretations recently proposed by the theoretical literature on the subject.
In light of the literature on catalytic finance and recent work by Corsetti et al. (2003) and
Morris and Shin (2003), we also address the role of IMF intervention on investor sentiment.
Finally, we consider the effect of global factors in the Brazilian turmoil. In particular, we
look for evidence of a contemporaneous increase in global risk aversion as a potential threat
to the vulnerable Brazilian economy during this period.
Building on previous work on contagion by Jeanne and Masson (1998) and Fratzscher
(2002) as well as the econometric literature on business cycles (Filardo and Gordon, 1998),
we apply a time-varying transition probability Markov-switching model to the analysis.
We find the use of such methodology particularly useful in detecting shifts in regime and
find that its performance is superior to simple linear models. In contrast to previous work
on this issue, we employ high-frequency financial data, as they seem better able to capture
shifts in investors’ behaviour. Specifically, we use sovereign bond spreads as a proxy for
country default risk. We assess the existence of a political “mistrust effect” for the left-wing
1 See Krueger [2002].
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candidate by means of an opinion polls variable and create an IMF dummy variable in order
to capture any catalytic effect arising from both positive and negative news from the IMF or
domestic politicians. We test for both financial and political contagion between Argentina
and Brazil by extending the analysis to Argentine data. Finally, we account for a global
factor effect by introducing into the empirical model the high-yield spread in developed
markets.
The empirical results strongly support the hypothesis of a shift in regimes in Brazil
during 2002, and indicate the political instability of the pre-electoral period and the global
increase in market risk aversion as main causes of the jump in equilibria. Negative news
concerning IMF intervention also has a significant impact on the probability of shifting
between regimes. Argentine country risk, however, affects only the extent of the Brazilian
turmoil, without triggering it.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section II reviews the main
events in Brazil during the summer of 2002 and the problem of public debt sustainabil-
ity. Section III addresses the main interpretations of the 2002 events with reference to the
current economic debate and the recent literature on financial crises. Section IV presents
the Markov-switching methodology adopted in the analysis. Section V discusses the main
empirical results of the model. Section VI concludes.
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2.2 The Depreciation of the Brazilian Real of 2002 and the
Problem of Debt Sustainability
In the summer of 2002, the Brazilian economy was subject to major currency turmoil with
a depreciation of its currency, the real, of over 30% between April and October (see Figure.
2.1). The exchange rate disorder was associated with a net drop in capital inflows, a sharp
rise in the interest rate spreads of Brazilian debt over US Treasury securities, and a fall
in domestic debt rollovers. This turbulence has been interpreted as the result of financial
market fears that Brazil could default on its public debt, following the example of other
emerging markets and especially that of its closest neighbour, Argentina.
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Figure 2.1: Nominal Exchange Rate and Bond Spreads
Sources: DataStream, JP Morgan (EMBI Global)
In the years preceding this financial distress episode, however, the Brazilian author-
ities had achieved a substantial improvement in the country’s institutional framework: the
1998 Fiscal Stabilisation Plan2 and the 2000 Fiscal Responsibility Law—as well as the
2 This law governs the spending patterns of the country’s federal states, by establishing limits on public
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greater transparency that came with the publication of improved government statistics and
the recognition of fiscal hidden liabilities—being among the most relevant reforms3. Since
1995, the fiscal balances had registered significant primary surpluses averaging about 3.5%
of GDP and high levels of fiscal revenue had been collected. The macroeconomic environ-
ment also benefited from an effective inflation-targeting policy, which delivered relatively
stable inflation in spite of the large currency depreciation. With respect to the trade posi-
tion, the competitive exchange rate allowed an improvement of the current account balance
(Figure 2.2). These outcomes are even more remarkable in light of the deteriorating macro-
economic situation in neighbouring Argentina, Brazil’s single-largest trading partner4: it is,
in fact, estimated that Brazilian exports to new markets were able to offset more than 80%
of the drop in exports to Argentina.
This economic framework seems at first sight to contain all the necessary ingredients
for a successful trend in Brazilian fundamentals, specifically with regard to debt dynamics.
On the basis of these results and of a consistent medium and long-term scenario, an IMF
fiscal sustainability analysis, released in January 2001, estimated a gradual net public debt
decline over time, assuming a continuation in the fiscal efforts of the federal government.
indebtedness or expenditure in personnel, and defining annual fiscal targets for three successive years.
3 See Goldfajn [2002].
4 The weight of the Argentine peso in the real effective exchange rate calculated by Banco do Brasil is
equal to 15.8% (second only to the US dollar with 32.4%) and reflects trade during the period 1998-2001.
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Figure 2.2: Real exchange rates and trade dynamics
Sources: Banco Central do Brasil, IFS
Nevertheless, these positive signals were unable to quell investors’ concerns over the
sustainability of Brazilian debt. In fact, the vulnerability of the Brazilian economy to shifts
in investor sentiment and other external shocks depended critically on the composition of
its public sector debt. Increased volatility in emerging markets in previous years, coupled
with Brazil’s past history of monetary and fiscal mismanagement, led to a strong demand
for indexed debt from foreign as well as domestic investors. As a result, beginning with the
East Asian crisis in 1997, a large share of prefixed Brazilian public debt had been converted
into indexed debt. As depicted in Figure 2.3, the share of public debt with a floating interest
rate5 (37% of the total) or linked to the exchange rate (42%) represented a major source of
vulnerability for the country. As a result, panic behaviour in the summer of 2002 was
more than sufficient to offset the efforts of the Brazilian authorities: any hostile market
5 The Selic is the overnight interest rate that is set by the Brazilian Central Bank.
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sentiment was self-validated by the rise in bond spreads and depreciation of the currency,
which pushed the debt-to-GDP ratio up to around 56% by end-20026.
Zero-interest debt 
5% 
Other
8%
Total dollar-
denominated debt
42% 
Inflation-linked 
domestic debt
8%
Selic-linked 
domestic debt
37%
Intern.
 Reserves
13%
Net External
Debt 17%Net Domestic
Debt  70% Gross External
Debt 30%
Figure 2.3: Composition of Brazilian Public-Sector Total Debt (Aug-2002)
Sources: Williamson [2002], Banco Central do Brasil.
2.3 Financial Contagion and Political Uncertainty
2.3.1 A Multiple Equilibria Story?
The 2002 currency panic in many ways resembles a self-fulfilling crisis episode, as opposed
to a “wake-up call” effect, where an external event reveals to investors the true state of the
fundamentals. In effect, the fiscal situation of Brazil in 2001 was far from unsustainable;
yet the level of public debt and, in particular, its flexible structure were not adequate to keep
the economy in the no-crisis state and left it vulnerable to shifts in investors’ expectations.
6 Williamson [2002] regards the 56% figure declared by the Brazilian CB as too low and takes this figure
up to 66%. Goldstein [2003] reports similar estimates for major rating agency and investment banks. Favero
and Giavazzi [2002] remark on the existence of hidden liabilities that are still not officially recognised and
that may account for as much as 10% of GDP.
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As described by second-generation crisis models,7 when an economy is exposed
to multiple equilibria, sunspots—i.e. factors able to coordinate and redirect investors’
expectations—can induce jumps between them. Such a mechanism is enabled only within
a certain range of the fundamentals necessary to place the country in the crisis zone: low
reserves, a negative trade balance and/or a large variable debt, as in the Brazilian case, are
among the most likely causes of vulnerability. According to this theoretical framework, it
follows that, given its fiscal situation, Brazil had two alternative stable equilibria: a “good”
equilibrium, characterised by constant capital inflows, relatively low interest rates, a sta-
bilisation of the exchange rate and, as a result, a manageable fiscal burden; and a “bad”
equilibrium, characterised by diminished foreign investment, high interest rates, an over-
depreciated currency and a far from sustainable debt-service figure.
Nevertheless, recent work on currency crises by Morris and Shin (1998) has focused
attention on the role of uncertainty and lack of common knowledge. In these models, the
introduction of noisy private information about fundamentals eliminates any common de-
vice able to coordinate investors’ actions and leads eventually, by iterated elimination in
a global-game framework, to selection of a unique equilibrium. Morris and Shin (2001)
(and Prati and Sbracia, 2003) extend this analysis in order to distinguish between differ-
ent sources of uncertainty (fundamental and strategic) as well as a different taxonomy of
information (private or publicly available). The result is a condition for uniqueness of equi-
librium which relies strongly on the precision of private signals relative to the underlying
uncertainty on the fundamentals. From this perspective, the Brazilian events of 2002 may
7 See the seminal paper of second-generation crisis models by Obstfeld (1996) or, for a text-book treatment,
Sarno and Taylor (2003).
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have been caused by a shift in fundamentals, where each agent takes a global perspective
and deduces when an adequate number of other players is ready to attack the currency.
This scenario needs by assumption to focus on the noisy character of the surrounding pub-
lic signals. In particular, with reference to the presidential campaign in Brazil during 2002,
uncertainty over economic fundamentals could include uncertainty over “political funda-
mentals”, assessed by agents according to their correlated private signals together with the
noisy public signals in the form of public opinion polls.
Notice, however, that if the strength and direction of common signals overcame the
precision of private information, we would be brought back to a multiple-equilibria sce-
nario,8 where sunspots are replaced by increases in the noise of individuals’ signals.9 Fol-
lowing this latter interpretation, the precision of private information may have been further
compromised by the vulnerable character of indexed Brazilian debt, since under indexation
a rise in the sovereign spread will actually increase the size of the debt, which may in turn
adversely affect market sentiment in a vicious spiral.
2.4 Modelling Crisis in a Nonlinear Framework
2.4.1 Nonlinear Analysis of International Financial Markets: A Brief
Review
The use of linear models in the analysis of financial time series presents a number of limita-
tions, as their formulation does not allow for the existence of unobservable factors (such as
8 See Hellwig (2002).
9 Heinemann and Illing (2002).
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changes in investors’ beliefs, herding behaviour, financial panic and political uncertainty)
that are likely to affect the process under investigation. For this reason, nonlinear empirical
analyses of financial and international financial variables have become increasingly popular
over the last decade or so. In particular, Markov-switching (MS) models represent a valu-
able tool for the purposes of the present analysis.10 Their attractiveness in the context of the
present analysis are clear: As MS models are designed explicitly to capture discontinuity
in the data-generating process, they allow us to model regime changes due to a structural
alteration in the economic system as well as extraordinary short-period events such as a fi-
nancial turmoil episode. Moreover, by allowing the estimation method to determine the
probability of being in any particular regime, we can avoid the a priori identification of
regimes and their timing, thereby enhancing the extent of flexibility in the analysis.
Given these attractive features, it is not surprising that the empirical literature on fi-
nancial crises and contagion reveals a growing interest in the use of this category of models.
The work of Jeanne and Masson (1998), who propose the utilization of a MS framework
in order to depict empirically the existence of multiple equilibria, represents one of the
first attempts in this vein. Specifically, these authors test a model of self-fulfilling expec-
tations in the speculation episode against the French franc in the period 1992-1993. Their
results show that the performance of the model improves significantly once sunspots are
introduced to influence devaluation expectations, by means of a MS approach. In Mas-
son (1999), however, some limitations in the use of MSVAR to the analysis of contagion
are discussed: in particular, the application of MS analysis to interest rates for Argentina
10 For a wide coverage of Markov switching models refer to Kim and Nelson [1999].
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and Brazil seems not to produce the expected results. Among the main problems identified
by Masson is the availability of an adequate data sample: the use of high frequency data
and the analysis of large asset price movements rather than crises per se are suggested as
possible alternatives. Fratzscher (2002) employs a MSVAR methodology to allow for a sys-
tematic comparison of the possible explanations of financial crises: fundamentals, sunspots
and contagion. Fratzscher’s empirical study is based on monthly data from 24 emerging
markets over the period 1986-1998. Only the inclusion of contagion variables—measuring
trade, financial and stock market interdependence across countries–allows the linear model
to perform as well as the nonlinear one, suggesting the effectiveness of MS modelling in
the detection of latent, crisis-generating factors. The MS methodology is applied to high-
frequency data by Sola et al. (2002) in order to account for changes in expectations and
investors’ beliefs in the test of volatility spillovers across stock markets. Finally, Tillmann
(2004) adopts a time-varying regime-switching regression in order to model the probability
of a currency crisis for the French franc and the Italian lira under the ERM. In particular,
the model tests for the theoretical predictions of models à la Morris and Shin (1998), by
introducing a measure of information disparities.
2.4.2 A Markov-Switching Model of Crisis with Endogenous Transition
Probabilities
In the present analysis, we use the Brazilian sovereign bond spread as a proxy for the
perceived risk of default, and estimate an equation explaining the behaviour of this equation
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that has a Markov-switching mean, in order to capture the presence of an immediate jump
of the series vector to its new level11. The model we consider is therefore of the form:
BRSPRt = α0 + α1St + β0xt + εt, εt˜N(0, σ2), (2.1)
where BRSPRt denotes the Brazilian spread, α0 and α1 are scalar parameters, xt is a vec-
tor of variables that influence the level of the spread, β is an associated vector of coefficients
and εt is a white-noise disturbance term. In this setup, a shift into crisis is represented by
a shift from the ‘normal state’, where St = 0 and the intercept term is just α0, to the crisis
state, where St = 1 and the intercept term becomes α0 + α1 so that (assuming α1 > 0) a
higher level of the sovereign spread is indicated, for any given values of xt.
In the standard MS model, the probabilities of switching between regimes are as-
sumed to be constant and exogenous. In the present analysis, however, we want to extend
this approach in order to examine whether the probability of being in a crisis state is de-
pendent upon one or more of a range of variables, as discussed above. Following Filardo
and Gordon (1998), we can model these probabilities using a latent variable probit model,
such that
Pr{St = 1} = Pr{S∗t ≥ 0}, (2.2)
where S∗t is a latent variable defined by the following equation
11 The same indicators estimated in a simple linear framework are not significant, with the only exception of
the Argentine spreads. The variables of the linear model, whose results we omit for brevity, are estimated in
differences, as integrated of order one and not cointegrated. However, the same variables are found stationary
at 10% critical level once structural breaks are accounted for, following the testing methodology by Perron
(1990). This result justifies the use of levels in the Markov switching specification.
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S∗t = γ0 + γ1St−1 + δ
0zt + ut, (2.3)
in which zt is a vector of variables that influence the transition probability with corre-
sponding factor loadings determined by the δ vector of parameters, γ0 and γ1 are scalar
parameters and ut is a standard normally distributed white-noise disturbance.12 The transi-
tion probabilities can then be derived by evaluating the conditional cumulative distribution
function for ut. Specifically, if the probability of the economy remaining in the crisis state
at time t once it is in crisis (St−1 = 1), given the values of zt, is pcct , then
pcct = Pr {St = 1|St−1 = 1, zt} = Pr {ut ≥ −γ0 − γ1 − δ0zt}
= 1− Φ[−γ0 − γ1 − δ0zt] (2.4)
where Φ[.] denotes the standard normal cumulative density function. Similarly, the prob-
ability of remaining in the tranquil state at time t, given zt (and, of course, St−1 = 0) may
be written:
pττt = Pr {St = 0|St−1 = 0, zt} = Pr {ut < −γ0 − δ0zt}
= Φ[−γ0 − δ0zt] (2.5)
Note that the probability of switching from state i to state j (i, j = c, τ , where
c denotes the crisis state and τ denotes the tranquil state) is straightforwardly given by
pijt = 1− piit (i, j = c, τ).
12 Normalising the variance of ut is an identifying assumption that can be imposed without loss of generality.
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Estimation of the time-invariant parameter vector (α0, α1, β0, γ0, γ1, δ
0, σ2)0, together
with estimated time series for the unobservable St, S∗t , p11t and p22t , can be carried out in
a Bayesian context using an application of the Gibbs sampler,13 as suggested by Filardo
and Gordon (1998). We followed the Gibbs-sampling methodology, although we employ
diffuse priors for all of the parameters so that the resulting estimator is in fact equivalent to
a standard maximum likelihood estimator.14
Of course, application of the model requires selecting a list of candidate variables
to include in xt and zt. Given the previous discussion, we considered the developed mar-
ket high-yield as a proxy for global factors, the Argentine sovereign spread as a potential
indicator of the contagion effect, opinion polls relating to the popularity of the left-wing
candidate in the 2002 Brazilian presidential elections, Lula de Silva, as a proxy for a “polit-
ical mistrust” variable, and an “aid and commitment” variable designed to capture positive
and negative declarations by the IMF concerning possible or agreed support programs to
Brazil or Argentina during this period. In the next sections we further justify the use of
these variables, while more detailed descriptions are given in the data appendix.
2.4.3 Global Factors: the Developed Market High-Yield Spread
There are at least two reasons why one might expect the developed market high-yield
spread—the spread between the return on less-than-investment-grade (“junk”) bonds and
government or other highly rated bonds—to have an effect on emerging markets. The
13 Albert and Chib (1993) suggest applying the Gibbs sampler to estimation of Markov-switching models
with fixed transition probabilities.
14 Convergence of the Gibbs sampler was achieved by using 10,000 passes, with the first 1,000 discarded.
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first is that movements in the high-yield spread may be a countercyclical leading indica-
tor of economic activity in developed markets, so that a rise in the spread may presage a
reduction in economic activity with a concomitant adverse effect on capital flows to emerg-
ing markets. The second is that the wedge between the return on high-yield bonds and
investment-grade bonds must, more generally, reflect the general attitude towards risk of
investors at that point in time—the bigger the wedge, the greater the degree of risk aversion
and the less willing will investors be to invest in emerging markets, other things equal.
The idea that the high-yield spread may be a countercyclical leading indicator of eco-
nomic activity derives from the theory of the financial accelerator.15 While the finer details
of financial accelerator models differ, their central features are reasonably uniform and their
key elements may be set out informally as follows: There is some friction present in the fi-
nancial market, such as asymmetric information or costs of contract enforcement, which,
for a wide class of industrial and commercial businesses, introduces a wedge between the
cost of external funds and the opportunity cost of internal funds—the “premium for ex-
ternal funds”. This premium is an endogenous variable, which depends inversely on the
balance-sheet strength of the borrower, since the balance sheet is the key signal through
which the creditworthiness of the firm is evaluated. However, balance-sheet strength is
itself a positive function of aggregate real economic activity, so that borrowers’ financial
positions are procyclical and hence movements in the premium for external funds are coun-
tercyclical. Thus, as real activity expands, the premium on external funds declines, which,
in turn, leads to an amplification of borrower spending, which further accelerates the ex-
15 See for example Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and the references therein.
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pansion of real activity. This is the basic mechanism of the financial accelerator. In line
with the predictions of the theory, Gertler and Lown (1999) and Mody and Taylor (2003)
find evidence of a strongly significant and negative relationship between the US high-yield
spread and US real activity.
With reference to the Brazilian events under investigation, the credit crunch and the
depressed real activity in developed markets associated also with theEnron scandal and the
related worries about firm accountability, may have generated serious spillovers into devel-
oping markets. In particular, the global portfolio rebalancing across classes of investment
risk, due to increased risk aversion, pushed up the bond rates of the major Latin American
economies. Figure 2.4 shows how the trends of the Brazilian sovereign spread and the and
index of developing countries’ high-yield spread show quite a similar pattern, especially
during the 2002 turmoil. However, the extent of the increase in the developed market high-
yield spread seems able to explain only partially the dramatic jump in Brazilian country
risk.
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2.4.4 The Role of the Argentine Crisis
Recent studies on financial crises in emerging markets have underlined the existence of
substantial spillover effects and contagion episodes amongst countries within a given re-
gional area. This feature can be related to common external macroeconomic shocks, trade
and financial linkages among countries or simply a shift in market sentiment. In his analy-
sis of the Mexican crisis, Calvo (1996) supports the idea of herd behaviour in this context,
with agents withdrawing their exposure from an entire group of interconnected markets in
response to signs of distress in just one of them, rather than bearing the costs of assessing
the true state of the underlying fundamentals relating to each market.
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This interpretation of contagion episodes could provide a potential explanation for
the events in Brazil. At the turn of the century, Argentina, the third largest economy in
Latin America and a key trade partner of Brazil, had been in recession since 1998 and was
registering a growing public-debt-to-GDP ratio, associated with high political instability,
and an overvalued exchange rate with large current account deficits. In January 2002,
the country devalued its currency abandoning the parity with the USD introduced under
the currency board in 1991. After the country default on public debt, the currency crisis
degenerated into a financial one, jeopardised by the asymmetric pesification of bank assets
and liabilities with an estimated mismatch of US$ 54 billion. The result of these events was
a loss of confidence in the domestic authorities and a corresponding currency and bank run
in an attempt to circumvent the introduced restrictions on cash current account withdrawals
and the freeze on time deposits.
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Despite the stronger fundamentals of the Brazilian economy, its vast stock of pub-
lic debt and its vulnerable composition made the country highly exposed to capital flow
reversals resulting from changes in market sentiment. The scene was therefore set for a
neighbouring crisis such as the Argentine one to generate wide spillovers. Although all
emerging markets were experiencing a reduction in foreign investments at the time, due
to portfolio reallocation and changes in risk assessment by investors, a “sudden stop” phe-
nomenon impacting upon Argentina and Brazil independently does not seem a plausible
explanation. Similarities and closeness probably determined a financial contagion effect of
its own which self-reinforced the common external shock. Nevertheless, this view is not
shared in academic and institutional circles. According to Krueger (2002), “contagion was
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limited because the Argentine default was largely expected. Indeed, the crisis seemed to
unfold almost in slow motion. As a result investors had ample opportunity to restructure
their portfolios in advance. With the exception of Uruguay, most Latin American banks
have maintained only a small exposure to Argentina.”. The following empirical analysis
may be viewed as an attempt to check the validity of these conclusions, by testing the ef-
fect of the Argentine crisis on Brazil, in terms of increased country risk (Figure 2.5)16. We
therefore included data on Argentine spreads in our empirical analysis.
2.4.5 Electoral Expectations and Country Risk
“Brazil has implemented strong and consistent macroeconomic policies in recent
years that have improved fundamentals [...] Despite these achievements, the uncer-
tain economic environment and some concerns about the course of economic policies
following the upcoming presidential elections have put substantial pressure on finan-
cial variables” (IMF Press release 02/40, September 2002).
The IMF, as well as a number of other economists, has pointed to the presidential
elections held in October 2002 as one of the main sources of economic instability in the
country in that period. The drop in net capital flows has in fact been explained as the result,
among other reasons, of investors’ worries concerning a possible shift in macroeconomic
policy following the likely victory of the left-wing candidate, Lula da Silva, in the presiden-
tial election contest, mainly due to Lula’s past declarations in favour of debt repudiation17.
Following this view, Razin and Sadka (2002) propose a multiple-equilibria debt-crisis
model for Brazil in 2002. The trigger able to coordinate market expectations and induce
creditors to change their beliefs about the country’s credit worthiness is represented by the
16 See Pericoli-Sbracia [2001] for a comprehensive review of the relevant literature on contagion.
17 See Williamson (2002) and (2003) for a wide examination of Brazilian politics in 2002.
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forthcoming elections, with a regime change. Once again, the crucial assumption in the
model for the occurrence of multiple equilibria is the presence of an indexed debt and the
dependence of the country risk on foreign lending. Miller et al. (2003) address the same
issue with a model of Bayesian learning, where the voters learn about the candidate’s policy
preferences and, above all, his attitude towards debt default. These authors allow also for
contagion effects from Argentina: the events in the neighbouring country do not cause
directly a shift between multiple equilibria; instead, the country debt repudiation raises
default expectations in Brazil by shifting prior beliefs about the nature of an incoming
left-wing government.
In light of these considerations, we added to our empirical analysis an examination of
the effect of a political variable. In particular, we attempted to capture public sentiment to-
wards the likely victory of the socialist candidate and the resulting worries for the country’s
future fiscal situation by using opinion-poll data in the run-up to the presidential election.
The net predominance of Lula’s support during the year preceding the elections is clearly
described by Figure 2.6, which presents the dynamics of the opinion polls for the favourite
candidates in terms of the percentage of those asked who stated that they were going to
vote for the candidate is question.
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In their paper on the influence of political instability on economic vulnerability, Bus-
sière and Mulder (1999) criticize the use of polls as an indicator because of their lack of
credibility, remarking how many election outcomes differ significantly from polls forecasts.
Nevertheless, in the context of this study, we believe that polls are the most suitable vari-
able, since we are not looking for exact forecasts of the political outcome, but for the best
public signal, available to foreign investors, of the average Brazilian voter preferences for
the presidential elections.
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2.4.6 What Role for IMF Catalytic Finance?
Finally, we are interested in considering whether the intervention of international financial
institutions (IFIs), such as the IMF, can potentially avoid the jump towards the crisis regime
or even preclude the existence of multiple equilibria.
In this regard, the literature on currency crises has tended to focus on the role of a
common lender of last resort, able to guarantee sovereign debt and honour it in case of
country default. This international guarantee has been widely criticised in the aftermath of
the Asian crisis, because of the strong moral hazard implications.
A parallel role attributed to IFIs is based on the doctrine of catalytic finance: official
assistance to a country in crisis would not only provide the necessary liquidity but would
contribute to a strengthening of market sentiment and hence encourage a return of private-
sector funding. Recent work by Corsetti et al. (2003) provides an explanation of how
such a stabilising mechanism may come into effect, by focusing on the coordination of
agents’ expectations and government incentives. The main characteristics of the model are
the insurgence of a liquidity problem, rather than a solvency one; the effectiveness of IMF
support even if the resources available are less than what is needed to close the financing
gap; and the possibility of restoring market confidence and thus generating a strong herding
effect that is able to solve any coordination failures among creditors. As regards potential
distortions in the policymaker behaviour, moral hazard arises only if the true nature of
government is misunderstood. In all other cases, a well-intentioned policymaker would
find in the IMF’s liquidity support, and in the private funding it promotes, the necessary
means to realise all the needed reforms. As suggested by Morris and Shin (2003), a useful
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integration of the literature on catalytic finance would suggest regarding IMF financial
support as conditional on earlier actions and the pre-commitment of the government.
Corsetti et al. (2003) refer to the Brazilian events as a likely example of the effec-
tiveness of IFI intervention in the presence of a country liquidity problem. The successful
exit from the currency and financial turmoil of Summer 2002 is likely to have been deter-
mined by the positive reaction of the markets to the IMF intervention on September 6, with
the approval of a 15-month stand-by credit of about US$31 billion. Furthermore, as has
been remarked by the IMF itself, “the commitment that the leading presidential candidates
have given to the core elements of the program already appears to have helped market
confidence”18, thus supporting the view that financial aid needs to be linked to a fiscally
committed government in order to be effective and credible.
With reference to the Brazilian experience, IMF intervention—coupled with the let-
ters of intent of policymakers and the policy declarations of the presidential candidates—
could have had an influence on the vulnerable debt situation as well on the political un-
certainty in the pre-election period. The mistrust of Brazilian and international investors
regarding the future policies of a left-wing government could have been more than offset
by the support action from the Fund.
The commitment not to repudiate the sovereign debt and to undertake all the neces-
sary policy actions to ensure fiscal sustainability, underpinned by the IMF agreement, may
have given a strong signal to the public on the true type of government. Chang (2002)
shows how financial assistance programs can have a significant impact on domestic poli-
18 IMF Press release 02/40, September 2002.
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tics and, surprisingly, how commitment to a common fiscal policy can especially benefit
the pro-labour party, by making candidates more alike. According to this view, the hy-
pothesis of the IMF’s intrusion in Brazilian politics, as well as its indirect support to the
outgoing administration’s candidate was totally unjustified.
From an empirical perspective, these theoretical results offer further possibilities for
investigation. As Miller et al. (2003) indicate, “just as bad news from Argentina could
increase sovereign spreads [...], so arrangements with the IMF might have the opposite
effect”. We therefore decided to introduce into our analysis two “aid and commitment”
variables, including both Argentine and Brazilian news, in order to test whether positive
and negative news concerning IMF intervention, as well as the political commitments from
the current government and the presidential candidates, may have had a significant impact
on the country default risk.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Estimates and Interpretation
Given the previous discussion, the candidate variables to include in our analysis in order
to explain the level and shifts in the level of the Brazilian sovereign spread (BRSPR)
were the Argentine sovereign spread (ARSPR), a measure of the perceived probability
of Lula’s successes in the presidential election, as measured by Brazilian opinion polls
(LULAOPP ), the developed market high-yield spread (HY ) and an aid-and-commitment
variable which took the value −1 when positive declarations were made concerning IMF
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programs to Argentina or Brazil (IMF_Y ES) and zero otherwise, one which took the
value 1 for negative declarations by IMF in this respect—which in the event only concerned
negative declarations about Argentina for this period—(IMF_NO)19. Further, because of
the high level of Argentine spreads over the period in question, we investigated whether
there was threshold effect concerning the influence of the Argentine sovereign spread when
ARSPR breached a 60% threshold.20 See the data appendix for further discussion of data
sources and methods.
Estimations were carried out using daily data for the period November 20, 2001 to
October 28, 2002, with a total sample of 245 observations21. With the exceptions of the
IMF news dummy variables, all variables were included with a one-period lag in order to
preclude any issues of endogeneity of the explanatory variables. In the initial estimations,
we included all of these variables in both of the estimated equations (i.e. in both xt and zt).
After sequentially setting statistically insignificant parameters to zero (using a 5% nominal
significance level), we settled on the following preferred specification (where I(.) denotes
an indicator variable that takes a value of unity when the indicated inequality is true, and
zero otherwise and estimated standard errors are given in parentheses below coefficient
estimates):
19 For merely computational reasons, pessimistic news have a positive sign in the dummy variable.
20 The threshold level of 60% was suggested by estimating a univariate, constant probabilities Markov-
switching autoregressive model for ARSPR.
21 We found extremely useful to have access to the Gauss codes by Martin Ellison (European University In-
stitute - April 2000), which we built on in order to develop the program for our model. We thank the author for
making them available on line (http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/ellison/software/tvtp.zip).
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BRSPRt =
6.832
(0.555)
+
5.687
(0.301)
St +
0.031
(0.009)
I(ARSPRt−1 < 60%)ARSPRt−1+
+
0.125
(0.004)
I(ARSPRt−1 ≥ 60%)ARSPRt−1 + εt; (6)
εt˜N(0, 2.41) (2.7)
P (St = 1) = P (S∗t > 0); (2.8)
S∗t =
−5.054
(0.753)
+
3.288
(0.178)
St−1 +
0.042
(0.006)
LULAOPPt−1 +
+
0.203
(0.075)
HYt−1 +
0.761
(0.174)
IMF_NOt + ut. (2.9)
ut˜N(0, 1) (2.10)
The results are extremely encouraging in that all of the estimated coefficients are strongly
statistically significantly different from zero and their sign in each case accords with our
economic intuition. The coefficient of St in equation (6) shows that a switch into the cri-
sis regime entails a jump of about 5.7% in the Brazilian sovereign spread. Interestingly,
the only other explanatory variable that was found to be significant in this equation was the
Argentine spread. Although this variable does not appear in the final latent variable equa-
tion (9), this in fact suggests a strong contagion effect, since a movement of the Argentine
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spread above 60% is accompanied by an increase in the slope coefficient by a factor of
about four (from 0.031 to 0.125), indicating a contribution to the Brazilian spread in excess
of 7%.
With regard to the latent variable equation, the estimated coefficient for the politi-
cal variable is also strongly significant22 and shows, as expected, a positive sign, in line
with the hypothesis of a direct relationship between Lula’s victory chances and the per-
ceived country default risk. As regards the global factor variable, the high-yield spread for
developed markets has a strong and significant impact on the probability of being in crisis.
We also find a positive relationship between the probability of being in crisis and the
IMF dummy variable for negative news, in favour of the idea that a programme refusal or
a pessimistic declaration by the IMF can deeply affect investors’ beliefs. In particular, the
negative-news variable reports the IMF refusal, on December 5, 2002, to complete the latest
review of Argentina’s IMF supported program, which would have allowed the country to
draw a further US$ 1.3 billion from the IMF23.
The positive IMF news variable was not found to be statistically significant. This
seems to reflect a bias of investors’ reaction towards bad news: while reassuring decla-
rations by political candidates and new agreement with the IMF appear to have had no
notable impact on market sentiment, negative remarks—which represent sporadic events—
can induce strong capital outflows and even trigger a crisis, by decreasing the probability
of remaining in a tranquil state. However, a deeper analysis of the estimated probability of
22 The LULAOPP variable is also economically significant, given it is expressed in percentage.
23 See IMF Survey 30-23.
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being in the crisis state, as drawn in Figure 2.7, shows a temporary tendency of the crisis
state to reverse towards the tranquil one in mid-August 2002: this trend precedes closely
the announcement of the approval of a $30.4 billion stand-by credit for Brazil and the ex-
tension of Argentina’s SRF repayment by one year, respectively on September 6 and 5. As
a result, we cannot exclude the hypothesis of a leak of information concerning the two IMF
interventions in the two weeks immediately before their official announcement to the press.
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Figure 2.7: Probability of a crisis state
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Figure 2.8: Brazilian spreads: actual versus fitted values
The R2 for the regression is equal to 0.9192, indicating that the selected explanatory
variables in the regression account for over 90% of the variation in the actual Brazilian
spreads. The good explanatory power of the specification is also illustrated by the plot of
the actual versus the fitted values of BRSPR in Figure 2.8.
We have shown how the currency and financial turmoil of 2002 in Brazil was trig-
gered by three kinds of signals: political mistrust by foreign investors concerning the con-
duct of the expected winner at the presidential elections, the behaviour of high-yield spreads
in developed markets and negative news concerning IMF intervention in Argentina. Finan-
cial spillovers from Brazil’s neighbour, Argentina, appear also to have a role in the 2002
events.
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2.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter has investigated the events of 2002 in Brazil, by testing empirically some of
the leading interpretations that have been advanced to account for the financial turmoil that
characterised that period. Markov switching modelling proved an appropriate econometric
tool in the analysis of distress periods. In effect, the possibility of capturing self-fulfilling
changes in market behaviour, by means of an endogenous regime-shift selection, allows re-
searchers to test multiple equilibria models empirically. Our estimates provide evidence in
favour of financial contagion from the Argentine crisis as well as of political uncertainty
during the pre-election period in Brazil. In particular, such instability is interpreted as po-
litical mistrust concerning the future conduct of the left-wing leader with respect to the
country’s fiscal obligations. While political uncertainty contributed to the strong jump in
Brazilian bond spreads, the spillover effect from Argentina seems to have affected only
the extent of the turmoil in Brazil. The intervention of the IMF, coupled with the fiscal
pre-commitments of the domestic authorities and the declarations of the presidential can-
didates, appeared instead to have a reverting effect on country risk. Nevertheless, while
positive news do not show up as a significant factor in avoiding a crisis, negative news and
declarations seem to have a deep impact on investors’ sentiment and to be determinant in
the probability of switching into a crisis regime.
However, this study is by no means exhaustive. Data availability represents the main
limitation of the analysis: the use of high-frequency data allows a better representation of
the dynamics of investors’ behaviour, but reduces the quantity of variables available at the
same time. The absence of daily observations for foreign reserves as well as for other fun-
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damental variables excludes the possibility of including these variables in the estimations.
In addition, even at lower frequency, there is still a difficulty in obtaining country-level data
on capital flow movements, while these are widely available for trade statistics. Finally, the
chronology of political events and IMF news would need to be compiled with reference to
the effective day of disclosure of the information to the markets, in order to take account of
the possible existence of “insider trading” and information leaks, given the large numbers
of people and institutions involved in the decision process.
Finally, the results of our study suggest a number of policy considerations. The sig-
nificant role of contagion between South American economies clearly needs to be taken
constantly into account by IFIs, notably the IMF, in their intervention strategies, perhaps
by means of more effective policy coordination in the region. Moreover, the potential for
IMF declarations and agreements to act as a common public signal able to coordinate mar-
ket expectations and hence generate a catalytic-finance effect strongly encourages further
research on this topic.
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2.A Appendix: Data Definitions and Sources
2.A.1 Sovereign spreads
The data source for bond spreads is the JP Morgan Chase’s Emerging Markets Global Bond
Index (EMBI Global). According to JP Morgan’s methodology brief24, the EMBI Global
includes U.S.-dollar-denominated Brady bonds, Eurobonds, traded loans and local mar-
ket debt instruments issued by sovereign and quasi-sovereign entities. The weight of each
individual issue in the country-by-country index is determined on the basis of market capi-
talisation. The use of a bond-spread index rather than the difference between an individual
sovereign bond yield and the US Treasury bill yield closest to it in issue date and maturity
allows for a better homogeneity of the data sample for different countries over time .The
EMBI Global Spreads are available at daily frequency since January 1, 1998 for Argentina
and Brazil (These two variables are referred to in the analysis as ARSPR and BRSPR).
2.A.2 Developed Market high-yield Spread
The data source for this variable is the JP Morgan Chase’s Developed Market high-yield
Summary Spread to Worst. The JPMorgan Developed Market HY Index represents all US$
denominated corporate issues, with issuers domiciled in countries labelled as industrial by
JPMorgan’s Economic Research Group. The spread is given by the difference between the
high-yield and yield of the Treasuries. Issues included in the index must be rated ”5B”
24 J.P.Morgan (1999)
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or lower. That is, the highest Moody’s/S&P ratings are Baa1/BB+ or Ba1/BBB+. The
inception date of the index is January 1994.
2.A.3 Political variable
Data on opinion polls during the 2002 presidential electoral campaign in Brazil have been
obtained from IBOPE (Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística). Daily ob-
servations have been linearly interpolated from the data series available, from Novem-
ber 20, 2001 to October 28, 2002, with a total sample of 245 observations (The variable
is named LULAOPP in the analysis). In particular, the following list of Pesquisas De
Opinião Pública Sobre Assuntos Políticos/ Administrativos (Public Opinion Surveys on
Political/Administrative Affairs) has been considered:
OPP169 19/nov/2001; OPP203 19/dez/2001; OPP006 21/jan/2002; OPP035 11/mar/2002; OPP051 18/mar/2002;
OPP079 21/apr/2002; OPP085 21/apr/2002; OPP107 19/mai/2002; OPP135 19/jun/2002; OPP172 07/jul/2002;
OPP184 14/jul/2002; OPP202 23/jul/2002; OPP218 30/jul/2002; OPP225 08/ago/2002; OPP235 13/ago/2002;
OPP249 20/ago/2002; OPP279 27/ago/2002; OPP305 03/set/2002; OPP329 09/set/2002; OPP351 17/set/2002;
OPP357 20/set/2002; OPP385 24/set/2002; OPP450 01/out/2002; OPP422 05/out/2002; OPP438 6/out/2002;
Result 1st round; OPP469 15/out/2002; OPP513 22/out/2002; OPP524 26/out/2002; OPP537 27/out/2002; Result
2nd round.
2.A.4 Aid and commitment variable
In the analysis we consider two different “aid and commitment” variables. The first
dummy variable (IMF_YES) takes a value equal to minus one each time the IMF
released optimistic declarations regarding possible or agreed supported programs to
Brazil or Argentina. The variable also includes the issue dates of letter of intents by
the Brazilian national authorities. In addition, news concerning the disbursement de-
lay of the IMF to Argentina on December 5, 2001 and any related event has been in-
cluded in an another dummy variable (IMF_NO), with a value of one. The main news
sources were the IMF website and major Brazilian newspapers and news and infor-
mation agencies. For the purposes of the analysis and according to the other variable
sample-periods, we used observations from between November 20 2001 through Oc-
tober 28 2002, for a total of twenty news items for Brazil and eleven for Argentina.
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The events captured by the two variables are listed below by country and typology of
news.
POSITIVE NEWS:
Brazil
19 November 2001 Statement by Mr. Pedro Malan, Minister of Finance of Brazil, at the International Mon-
etary and Financial Committee, Ottawa, November 17, 2001
30 November 2001 Brazil Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic Policies, and Technical Memorandum
of Understanding
23 January 2002 News Brief: IMF Completes First Review of Stand-by Arrangement with Brazil
28 January 2002 IMF Survey: IMF approves review of Brazil’s performance
07 February 2002 Public Information Notice: IMF Concludes 2001 Article IV Consultation with Brazil
04 March 2002 Brazil Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic Policies, and Technical Memorandum of
Understanding, March 4, 2002
26 March 2002 News Brief: IMF Completes Second Review of Stand-By Arrangement with Brazil
22 April 2002 Statement by Mr. Pedro Malan, Minister of Finance of Brazil to the International Monetary
and Financial Committee, Washington, D. C., April, 20, 2002
27 May 2002 IMF Survey: Brazil positioned to speed up growth
05 June 2002 Brazil – Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, Technical Memo-
randum of Understanding
14 June 2002 Brazil – Letter of Intent
18 June 2002 News Brief: IMF Completes Third Review of Stand-By Arrangement with Brazil
21 June 2002 Lula’s ”Carta ao Povo Brasileiro”
24 June 2002 IMF Survey: Brazil can draw $10 billion;
23 July 2002 Lula’s ”Compromisso com a soberania o emprego e a seguranca do povo brasileiro”
07 August 2002 News Brief: IMF Managing Director Köhler Confirms Agreement with Brazil
29 August 2002 Brazil – Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic Policies, and Technical Memorandum
of Understanding
06 September 2002 Press Release: IMF Approves US$30.4 Billion Stand-By Credit for Brazil
16 September 2002 IMF Survey: Brazil loan
30 September 2002 IMFC Statement by Mr. Pedro Malan, Minister of Finance of Brazil, on behalf of the
Constituency comprising Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, Panama, Suriname,
and Trinidad and Tobago
28 October 2002 News Brief: IMF Managing Director Köhler Congratulates Brazil’s President-Elect
Argentina
16 January 2002 Press Release: IMF Extends Argentina’s SRF Repayment by One Year
28 January 2002 IMF Survey: IMF extends Argentine debt deadline
08 February 2002 News Brief: IMF’s Köhler Welcomes Remes Visit, says IMF Working Closely with Ar-
gentina
13 February 2002 News Brief: IMF’s Köhler: Good Start to New Relationship with Argentina
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04 March 2002 News Brief: IMF Sending Mission to Argentina
11 March 2002 IMF Survey: IMF mission to Argentina
15 March 2002 News Brief: Press Statement by the IMF Mission to Argentina
25 March 2002 IMF Survey: IMF statement on Argentina
10 April 2002 IMF Encourages Argentine Reforms, By Thomas C. Dawson, Director, Ext. Rel. Dept, IMF;
Introductory Remarks on the Role of the IMF Mission in Argentina by Anoop Singh, Dir. for Special Operations,
IMF
17 April 2002 Statement by the IMF Mission to Argentina
21 May 2002 News Brief: IMF Managing Director meets Argentine Economy Minister, Board extends re-
payment of SRF
28 June 2002 News Brief: IMF’s Köhler Welcomes Progress in Talks with Argentina
08 July 2002 IMF Survey: Köhler on Argentina
10 July 2002 News Brief: IMF Managing Director Horst Köhler Announces Advisory Group on Argentina
15 July 2002 Press Release: IMF Extends Argentina’s SRF Repayment by One Year
22 July 2002 IMF Survey: Advisory panel for Argentina
29 July 2002 News Brief: IMF Managing Director Köhler Welcomes Independent Advisors’ Report on Ar-
gentina
05 August 2002 IMF Survey: Krueger on Argentina
05 September 2002 Press Release: IMF Extends Argentina’s SRF Repayment by One Year
NEGATIVE NEWS:
Argentina
05 December 2001 Transcript of a Press Briefing by Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations De-
partment, IMF
06 December 2001 Transcript of a Press Briefing by Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations De-
partment, IMF
10 December 2001 IMF Survey: Argentine disbursement delayed
Chapter 3
Are There Thresholds of Current Account
Adjustment in the G7?
3.1 Introduction
The sustainability and adjustment of current account imbalances among the world’s major
industrialized countries is a subject that is receiving considerable attention among policy-
makers, financial market practitioners and academics. At more than $600 billion and nearly
6 percent of US GDP, the US current account deficit attracts the most focus, but there are
also material current account imbalances in other deficit countries such as the UK and in
surplus countries such as Japan and Germany.
Some respected experts have expressed concern that current account imbalances of
this magnitude and persistence indicate that the global economy is operating in a “danger
zone” in which disruptive and volatile reactions in currency, bond, and equity markets are
likely to result. For example, in C. Fred Bergsten (2002, p.5) has argued that ”research at
both the Federal Reserve Board and the Institute for International Economics reveals that
industrial countries, including the United States, enter a “danger zone” of current account
unsustainability when their deficits reach 4-5 percent of GDP[...] At these levels, corrective
forces tend to arise either spontaneously from market forces or by policy action”. Other
observers have made a similar point, arguing that there is a “threshold” current account
imbalance beyond which current account adjustment must ultimately take place, even if
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evidence of adjustment is scarce or non-existent before the threshold is reached. This point
of view is represented clearly in a recent survey paper on this subject prepared by the Fed
Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Holman (2001, p.16)):
While there is considerable uncertainty about the precise threshold [...] a current
account deficit greater than 4.2 percent of GDP is unsustainable. This estimate, based
on the 1980s and early 1990s, represents the average threshold at which current ac-
count deficits in several industrialized economies started to narrow after trending up
for a sustained period.
Existing empirical work on this subject is suggestive but is not in fact specifically
aimed at answering the question “are there thresholds of current account adjustment”, or
exploring its implications. Influential papers by Milesi Ferretti-Razin (1998) and Freund
(2000) employ a careful and informative methodology to pull together a set of empirical
regularities about how adjustments of large current account deficits have taken place in
previous “episodes” which meet certain ex ante criteria. For example, in order for a current
account deficit adjustment episode (called a reversal) to be included in the Freund sample,
it must meet the following four criteria:
1. The current account deficit exceeded two percent of GDP before the reversal.
2. The average deficit was reduced by at least two percent of GDP over three
years (from the minimum to the three-year average).
3. The maximum deficit in the five years after the reversal was not larger than the
minimum deficit in the three years before the reversal.
4. The current account was reduced by at least one third.
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These are very similar to the criteria introduced by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1998)
in their study. Their motivation for focusing on the adjustment of large current account
deficits that meet these criteria is explained as follows (p. 12):
In the definition of reversal events we want to capture large and persistent im-
provements in the current account imbalance, that go beyond short-run current ac-
count fluctuations as a result of consumption smoothing. The underlying idea is that
“large” events provide more information on determinants of reductions in current ac-
count deficits than short run fluctuations.
The work of Milesi Ferretti - Razin, Freund, and – using a somewhat different method-
ology Mann (2002) – has had an impact on the way that policymakers discuss current ac-
count adjustment, especially in the context of the record US deficits recorded in recent
years. For example, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan (2003), citing Freund’s work
has said:
[W]hat do we know about whether the process of reining in our current account
deficit will be benign to the economies of the United States and the world? According
to a Federal Reserve staff study, current account deficits that emerged among devel-
oped countries since 1980 have risen as high as double-digit percentages of GDP
before markets enforced a reversal. The median high has been about 5 percent of
GDP.
While much can be and has been learned by studying past episodes of adjustment
of large current account deficits (as defined by the criteria used by Milesi Ferretti-Razin
and Freund), there remains a number of unresolved empirical questions pertaining to the
modeling, estimation, and interpretation of the current adjustment process among the large
industrialized countries. These questions include:
• Does the process of adjusting to current account deficits differ from the process of
adjusting to current account surpluses? (does sign matter?)
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• Does the process of adjusting to ”large” current account imbalances differ from the
process of adjusting to smaller current imbalances? (does size matter?)
• If so, is there a way to estimate how large is ”large” and does this estimate differ
from country to country? (does one size fit all?)
• Is the absence of evidence about the adjustment of a large current account imbalance
evidence in favor of the sustainability of said large imbalance? (is the absence of
evidence evidence of sustainability?)
It is the aim of this chapter to provide an empirical framework that can be used to be-
gin to answer questions such as these. We will argue that, for any particular country, all
four of these issues are in fact intrinsically related to one another and to the specification
of the econometric model which best describes that country’s current account dynamics.
If the current account, suitably scaled by net output (GDP net of investment and govern-
ment purchases), is a linear, stationary stochastic process with a constant unconditional
mean, as is often assumed in empirical work, then the answers to these four questions are
straightforward: ‘no’, ‘no’, ‘moot’, and ‘yes’.
An immediate implication of stationarity is that any current account/net output ra-
tio not equal to the unconditional mean is unsustainable by the definition of a stationary
stochastic process. This applies to surpluses as well as deficits. However, as an empirical
matter, the dynamic process by which the current account adjusts to its unconditional mean
depends crucially on whether the process is linear or nonlinear. In particular, if the process
is linear, adjustment is symmetric above and below the long-run equilibrium, and the speed
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of adjustment is independent of the magnitude of the displacement from long-run equilib-
rium (the unconditional mean). For a linear, stationary current account/net output process,
there is nothing to be gained by just focusing on the adjustment of current account deficits
and excluding the data on adjustment to surpluses (all relative to the unconditional mean
current account/net output ratio which may be either positive or negative). Moreover, there
is no reason to focus on the adjustment to “large” deficits as providing different or more in-
formation than episodes of adjustment to small deficits (relative to the unconditional mean)
since all episodes provide the same information. Finally, as should be obvious by now,
for a linear stationary stochastic process there is no particular ”threshold” beyond which
markets and/or shifts in policy force a reversal and below which adjustment is absent.
By contrast, if the stationary stochastic process which governs the current account
adjustment to its long mean is non-linear, then both the “sign” and “size” of the current ac-
count imbalance does matter for the adjustment process, and the size of the current account
imbalance beyond which adjustment takes place may well be country specific (as alluded
to by Chairman Greenspan and as is suggested by the empirical work cited above). Finally,
if the stationary stochastic process is non-linear, absence of evidence of adjustment of a
large current account imbalance is not evidence of the absence of the ultimate adjustment
of the imbalance.
There is a tractable and testable nonlinear time series model that conveniently ex-
hibits all of the features of the current account adjustment process that have been the focus
of recent discussions, and that nests as a special case the linear stationary stochastic process
model for the current account that is often assumed in empirical work. It is the thresh-
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old auto regression model introduced in Tong (1978) and studied extensively by Hansen
(1996,1999a, 1999b). For a stationary stochastic threshold model with mean μ and thresh-
olds δ and δ, there is no tendency for ca = current account/net output − μ to adjust to
its mean of 0 unless it has crossed either the threshold δ or the threshold δ. In the ‘regime’
with δ < ca < δ, deficits or surpluses (relative to μ) persist, and there is no tendency for
imbalances to revert. However, the absence of evidence of mean reversion in this regime is
not evidence that deficits or surpluses relative to μ are ‘sustainable’ since, by stationarity,
the only sustainable current account imbalance is equal to the unconditional mean.
In a threshold model, a necessary condition for adjustment to commence is for ca
to cross either the deficit threshold δ or the surplus threshold δ, parameters which can be
estimated from the data, not imposed ex ante. In the deficit adjustment regime, ca < δ ,
and cat = ρcat−1 + εt. Adjustment continues until ca reaches δ at which point any further
adjustment is driven by shocks to εt. In the surplus regime adjustment regime, ca > δ ,
and cat = ρcat−1 + εt. Adjustment continues until ca reaches δ at which point any further
adjustment is driven by shocks to εt. Evidently, in a threshold model, the sign and size
of the ca imbalance can matter, thresholds can differ across countries, and the absence
of evidence of adjustment is not the evidence of absence of future adjustment of the ca
imbalance.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic empirical
predictions of the modern workhorse model of the current account, the rational expecta-
tions, intertemporal approach model developed in Sachs (1981, 1982), estimated by Shef-
frin and Woo (1990), and recently extended by Kano (2003). The basic prediction of this
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model, once one allows for permanent shocks to the level of net output as in Campbell and
Deaton (1989), is that the ratio of the current account to net output (GDP less investment
less government purchases) should be a stationary stochastic process with an unconditional
mean determined by the relationship between the real interest rate and the per capita rate of
growth. We also argue that a general equilibrium, two-country version of the Weil (1989)
infinite horizon, overlapping generations model of the current account – a model in which
the global real interest rate and the net foreign asset or liability position of each country is
endogenously determined – also has the prediction that the current account to net output
ratio is constant in steady state and determined by underlying parameters such as rates of
time preference, the steady state rate of global growth, and the relative size of the two coun-
tries. In this chapter, we will follow most of the empirical work in this area and take the
stationarity of the current account to net output ratio as given. The question at the heart of
the present chapter is whether or not the stationary stochastic process which describes the
current account to net output ratio in the G7 countries features linear or nonlinear adjust-
ment to the unconditional mean. We conclude Section 2 by presenting, for each G7 country
the results of a non-parametric statistical test of the null hypothesis of a linear adjustment
of the current account to net output ratio against the alternative of non-linear adjustment
using quarterly data for the sample 1979:1 - 2003:3. This is an application of a test for
nonlinearity developed by Terasvirta (1994). For the G7 countries in our sample, we find
statistically significant evidence against the null of linear adjustment of the current account
to net output ratio and in favor of the alternative of nonlinear adjustment.
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In Section 3 of the chapter, we estimate for each G7 country a threshold autore-
gressive model of the current account to net output ratio, allowing for country-specific
thresholds of current account surplus and deficit adjustment in each country (as suggested,
for example, by Chairman Greenspan’s comments), and also allowing for country specific
means for the ratio of the current account to net output (as suggested, for example, by the
general equilibrium version of the Weil model reviewed in Section 2). Our main findings
in this section are as follows. For most of the G7 countries, we find significant evidence of
threshold effects in current account adjustment. We also find that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of a random walk for the current account imbalance in each country when that
ratio does not exceed (in absolute value) the country specific surplus and deficit thresholds
(relative to the country specific mean) estimated for that country. For most of the G7 coun-
tries, unless the current account imbalance is ‘too large’ – as suggested by Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin (1998) – there does not appear to be a systematic tendency for adjustment to oc-
cur. A further advantage of our approach is that we can estimate from the data how large
a current imbalance has to be before this imbalance triggers an adjustment, and we can al-
low these estimated thresholds to differ across countries. In fact we find substantial cross
country variation in the surplus and deficit thresholds that trigger current account adjust-
ment in each country. We also find evidence of cross country and cross regime variation in
the autoregressive dynamics estimated during adjustment regimes for each country
In Section 4, we investigate what happens to the probability distributions of nominal
exchange rate changes, stock price index changes, and long term interest rate differentials
during the various current account adjustment regimes that we estimate for each country
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in Section 3. The motivation is to determine whether or not crossing the current account
adjustment threshold is itself associated with shifts in the probability distributions for ex-
change rates, stock prices, and interest differentials. We specifically account for – and allow
for current account regime-specific shifts in – autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
as well as for shifts in the mean by estimating generalized autoregressive conditionally het-
eroskedastic (GARCH) models for nominal exchange rate changes, stock prices changes,
and interest differentials. We also in this section explore, for the US, whether or not the
expectation of a future adjustment in the current account imbalance is associated with a
present shift in the probability distribution of exchange rates, stock prices, or interest dif-
ferentials. We proxy this by including in the GARCH models two dummy variables (one
for deficits and one for surpluses) which represent the distance between the current account
imbalance and its country-specific mean when the imbalance is between the thresholds.
In Section 5, we draw on our empirical results to take stock of the present US current
account deficit. Our empirical results indicate that compared to other G7 countries, the US
over our sample exhibited relatively wide thresholds within which current account adjust-
ment is absent and relatively slow speeds of adjustment once these thresholds, especially
the deficit threshold, are crossed. Moreover, the present US current account deficit sub-
stantially exceeds – and has for some time – our estimated thresholds of current account
deficit adjustment for the US. We explore several possible explanations. The first is that
the threshold model, while a useful description of current account adjustment for other G7
countries, does not apply to the US and that the present deficit of nearly 6 percent of GDP
is in fact sustainable. The second explanation is that there are thresholds of current account
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adjustment for the US, but that adjustment has been delayed over the past several years,
due to unusual circumstances that were not in evidence during the sample over which the
models were estimated, 1979-2003. These circumstances could include: (i) the low level
of global real interest rates (which support higher levels of investment and lower levels of
saving in the US than would be the case with historically average or above average real in-
terest rates); (ii) the more muted and less uniform decline in the dollar than occurred, for
example, during the 1985 - 1987 Plaza-Louvre episode (reflecting the intervention activi-
ties of Asian central banks); (iii) the fact that the US continues to run a substantial surplus
in dividends, interest, and profits on its stock of foreign assets compared with the divi-
dends, interest, and profits that it pays out on its much larger stock of foreign liabilities;
(iv) the adjustment in the net foreign liability position of the US that occurs as a result of
dollar depreciation (which in 2003 offset almost 80 percent of that year’s current account
deficit). We review and evaluate these potential explanations for the absence of adjustment
to date in the US current account deficit even though it has passed well beyond thresholds
that would have triggered adjustments in other G7 countries.
Section 6 provides some concluding remarks.
3.2 A Test for Non-Linear Current Account Adjustment
3.2.1 Theoretical Considerations
In our empirical work, we shall be modeling the dynamics of G7 current account adjust-
ment. However, it is important to take a stand as to exactly what it is to which G7 current
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account imbalances are adjusting. In this chapter, we draw on the implications for long-run
current account equilibrium of the workhorse intertemporal model of the current account
(Sachs, 1981; Sheffrin and Woo, 1990, via Campbell, 1987). This model can be writ-
ten CAt = −Et
P
(1 + r)−i∆Zt+i where Zt = Yt − It − Gt is the level of net output.
The intertemporal approach models have been estimated and tested many times, and their
high frequency implications – that current account dynamics are fully described by the dis-
counted sum of future changes in net output – are usually rejected. However, we argue
that the intertemporal model, properly specified to allow for stationarity in long run growth
rates, contains an important insight about the long run behavior of the current account. It
would seem preferable to model ∆ logZt = ∆zt as stationary. Following Campbell and
Deaton (1989), it is straightforward to show (Kano, 2003) that the log-linear approxima-
tion of the intertemporal approach model is given by CAt/Zt ≈ −Et
P
(1+r−g)−i∆zt+i
where g is the unconditional mean of ∆zt. Note that if the log difference of net output is
stationary, it is the current account to net output ratio which is stationary, not simply the
current account itself. This seems like a more sensible long-run equilibrium condition than
to assume that the current account itself is stationary.
The intertemporal approach model is partial equilibrium and is usually studied for the
special case in which r is equal to the rate of time preference. However, the basic prediction
of that model – that the ratio CA/Z is constant in the long run – also holds in the steady
state of a two-country version of Weil’s (1989) infinite horizon overlapping generations
model. As shown in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1994, page 188), the Weil model with discount
factor β implies that the steady state current account to net output ratio is constant and
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given by CA/Z = (n + g)θ where n is the rate of population growth, g is the rate of net
output growth, and θ is the endogenous ratio of net foreign assets to net output given by the
solution to θ[1− (1 + r)β/(1 + n)(1 + g)] = [(1 + r)β − (1 + g)]/(1 + n)(1 + g)(r− g).
Now imagine two such economies trading goods and bonds with one another that differ in
two respects: size and the discount factor. Let β1 < β2 and suppose that country 2 is larger
than country 1. It is easy to show that in the steady state of a two-country version of the
Weil model, the β1 smaller country will run a steady state current account to net output
deficit and the larger more patient β2 country will run a steady state current account to net
output surplus. Based on these considerations, we shall assume that for each G7 country,
the ratio CA/Z is stationary and allow for country specific means in the CA/Z ratio.
3.2.2 Testing for Non-Linearities in G7 Current Account Adjustment
This chapter is an empirical study of G7 current account adjustment, based on quarterly
data for the period 1979:1 to 2003:3 (the data available when we began our study in the
fall of 2003). We choose our starting date to begin six years after the advent of floating
exchange rates and the initial globalization of the international capital market that occurred
at that time and in conjunction with the first oil shock. The data in the analysis are obtained
from the International Financial Statistics Database by the IMF. All variables are seasonally
adjusted and expressed in national currency. According to national account statistics, the
current account variable is estimated as the sum of net exports and net primary income from
abroad (NPIA); net output is obtained by subtracting Government consumption expenditure
and gross fixed capital formation (investment) to GDP.
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We test for non-linearity in G7 current account/net output adjustment following the
non-parametric test for nonlinearity developed by Luukkonen et al. (1988) and Terasvirta
(1994). These authors propose a Lagrange Multiplier test for a third-order Taylor approxi-
mation to the regression function of the form: cat = β00 +
pP
i=1
[β1icat−1 + β2icat−icat−d +
β3icat−ica2t−d + β4icat−ica
3
t−d] + εt. This artificial regression allows to identify general
nonlinearity through the significance of the higher-order terms. The main advantage of this
type of test is that it can be carried out by simple OLS and that – despite being designed
for smooth transition regressions – is sensitive to a wide range of non-linearities (Granger
and Terasvirta, 1993), although there is reason to suspect that the power of the test may be
weak against some nonlinear alternatives. The results of this test are reported in Table 3.1.
Country Terasvirta Linearity Tests:
CAN Marginal significance level  0.369
FRA Marginal significance level  0.029
GER Marginal significance level  0.035
ITA Marginal significance level  0.136
JAP Marginal significance level  0.027
UK Marginal significance level  0.184
US Marginal significance level  0.069
Table 3.1: Terasvirta Linearity Tests
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Hence, evidence of nonlinear adjustment is indicated at the 5% significance level for
France, Germany and Japan, and at the 7% level for the US.
Using the multivariate bootstrap test procedure developed by Hansen (1997), the null
hypothesis of linear adjustment in all countries is rejected at the 14% level. Given the pos-
sibly poor power characteristics of these tests, therefore, we felt encouraged to investigate
the estimation of nonlinear models more directly.
3.3 Estimating and Testing Thresholds Models of G7 Current
Account Adjustment
In this section of the chapter, we estimate and test for each G7 country a threshold au-
toregression model of the current-account-to-net-output ratio using the univariate approach
developed in Hansen (1996). We allow for and estimate country-specific means, country
and regime-specific thresholds, and country and regime specific dynamic adjustment once
the current account has crossed either of the thresholds. Letting ca = CA/Z−μ , we write
the equilibrium threshold autoregressive (TAR) model as
cat = ρ× 1{cat−d, δ} × cat−1 + ρ× 1{cat−d, δ} × cat−1 + (3.11)
+(1− 1{cat−d, δ})× (1− 1{cat−d, δ})× cat−1 + et
where 1{cat−d, δ} is an indicator function that takes on a value of 1 when cat−d >
δ > 0 (and zero otherwise) and 1{cat−d, δ} is an indicator function that takes on a value of
1 when cat−d < δ 6 0 (and zero otherwise). This approach postulates that the persistence
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of the current account imbalance in a country may depend upon whether or not the current
account imbalance has crossed a surplus ‘threshold’ of δ > 0 or a deficit threshold of δ 6 0.
We note that a special case of the threshold model is the case in which δ = δ = 0 and ρ = ρ
< 1 in which case it collapses to a linear stationary AR(1) process. We experimented with a
threshold TAR(2) specification but found in general the second lag terms to be insignificant,
and thus confine our presentation to the TAR(1) models. We also select a delay parameter
d of two quarters as this maximises the fit of the regression in each case.
The threshold model can potentially identify three regimes of current account adjust-
ment: a surplus adjustment regime, a deficit adjustment regime, and an ‘inertia’ regime
δ < cat−2 < δ in which the current account appears to follow a random walk. In a more
general smooth threshold transition autoregressive or STAR model (e.g. Taylor, Peel and
Sarno, 2001), the speed of adjustment does not increase discontinuously at the threshold;
rather, the further way is the current-account-to-GDP ratio from its long-run mean, the
faster the current account imbalance adjusts. Interestingly, when we experimented with es-
timating smooth transmission models, we found they did not capture G7 current account
dynamics in a sensible way. As we shall report next, there does in fact appear to be impor-
tant, discrete threshold effects which influence current account adjustment.
Before presenting the results, we will discuss some issues involved in the estima-
tion and testing of these model for a system comprised of the G7 countries. The ca vari-
ables for the G7 group are first demeaned, in order to allow for the existence of long-run
deficit/surplus means for each country rather than a zero ca balance. A non-zero mean
proves to be applicable for all G7 countries, with the single exception of Italy. In partic-
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ular, we detect a structural break in the German series in 1991, corresponding with the
German unification and the resulting change in the country national accounts; we account
for the break by allowing two different means in the current account for the pre- and post-
unification periods.
The two asymmetric thresholds in the TAR model are selected jointly by minimisa-
tion of the overall sum of squared errors. The estimation method involves a double grid
search over ca. Following Hansen (1997), the range for the grid search is selected a pri-
ori to contain ca observations in between the 15th (ca) and the 85th percentile (ca). This
reduction in the grid range is needed in order to avoid sorting too few observations in one
regime for extreme values of the thresholds. As a result, the appropriate ranges are defined
asR = [μ, ca] andR = [μ, ca], for δ and δ respectively.
As the minimisation process for a three-regime/ two-threshold TAR process is numer-
ically intensive, we rely on the estimation methodology proposed by Hansen (1999a) for
multiple thresholds. This consists of a three-stage grid search, where the second-stage es-
timation of the two-threshold model is made conditional on the first-stage single-threshold
estimate of δ (either δ or δ), the third stage being used as a refinement.
Furthermore, final estimates of slope parameters and standard errors for the G7 group
of countries are obtained by seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation, in order to
allow for potential correlation between the disturbances of the different ca equations, due
to common unobservable factors.
Once the thresholds have been selected, according to standard asymptotic theory,
(1) is linear in the parameters. As with any simple dummy-variable regression, it can be
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estimated by linear methods. However, statistical inference in a TAR model bears the
difficulty that the thresholds δ and δ may be not identified under the null hypothesis in
question (Davies, 1987). In this case, the usual χ2 distribution needs to be replaced by
an approximated empirical distribution obtained by bootstrapping the residuals (Hansen
1997). In particular, artificial observations are calibrated using the restricted estimates and
are then used to obtained new estimates of the restricted and unrestricted model (for an
application, see Peel and Taylor 2002). The percentage of bootstrap samples – we run
1000 replications – for which the simulated likelihood-ratio statistics exceeds the actual
one forms the bootstrap approximation to the p-value of the test statistic under question.
The estimation and testing results are presented in Table 3.2. First the test results:
when we test the null hypothesis a single threshold for all countries versus the alternative
hypothesis of two thresholds, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative. This
is consistent with three regimes for each country - a surplus adjustment regime, a deficit
adjustment regime, and an inertia (absence of adjustment) regime. Second, when we test
the hypothesis that the current account follows a random walk inside the ‘inertia’ regime
against the alternative that it follows a mean reverting autoregressive process inside the
inertia regime (a more general formulation of the threshold model) we are unable to reject
the null of a random walk inside the inertia regime. In summary, the statistical tests find
evidence of non-linear current account adjustment and also identify significant thresholds
beyond which current account adjustment takes place.
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CA/NO           
Q1 1979- Q3 2003
COUNTRY Upper threshold Lower threshold above band below 'Surplus' 'Deficit'
1.41 -4.05 0.927 1.000 0.930 -1.792
(0.048) (0.060)
2.13 -1.13 0.931 1.000 0.910 1.646
(0.048) (0.045)
2.84 0.00 0.880 1.000 0.827 6.185 Pre-1991
(0.070) (0.064) 1.496 Post-1991
0.00 -0.37 0.944 1.000 0.867 -0.269
(0.058) (0.059)
0.84 -0.18 0.908 1.000 0.894 3.951
(0.058) (0.037)
1.08 0.00 0.777 1.000 0.929 -1.764
(0.073) (0.064)
2.15 -2.18 0.907 1.000 0.973 -2.011
(0.039) (0.034)
Bootstrap:
LR-test for band coefficient equal to 1 (SUR): marg.signif. level = 0.520
LR-test for single threshold (SUR): marg. signif. level = 0.004
CANADA
FRANCE
GERMANY
ITALY
SE in brackets
JAPAN 
UK
US
Slope coefficients (estimation 
by SUR) MeansThresholds (asymmetric band)
Threshold models of de-meaned CA/NO
Table 3.2: Thresholds Models of Current Account
We now discuss the parameter estimates for the threshold models estimated for each G7
country. To repeat, these estimates allow for country-specific means, country and regime-
specific thresholds, and country and regime specific autoregressive dynamics. A number
of interesting results are obtained. First, as suggested by Chairman Greenspan’s comment
cited above, we see there is wide cross-country variation in the estimated current account
deficit adjustment thresholds. For example, the estimated deficit adjustment threshold for
the US is -2.18 percent of net output, while for Japan it is only -0.18 percent of net out-
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put. This means that empirically, there is no evidence from these estimates of systematic
adjustment in the US current account deficit until the deficit exceeds -4.19 percent of net
output (equal to the mean of -2.01 plus the threshold of -2.18), while for Japan, adjust-
ment begins to take place when the surplus falls below 3.77 percent of net output (equal
to the mean of 3.95 plus the deficit threshold of -0.18). We estimate a similar pattern for
the other ‘structural’ surplus countries, France and Germany. For France, we estimate that
adjustment begins to take place once the surplus falls below 0.51 percent of net output;
for Germany adjustment begins to take place once the surplus falls below the mean of 6.19
before unification and 1.19 percent after unification. Second, we see that for most G7 coun-
tries, there are thresholds of adjustment to current account surpluses as well as for current
account deficits. Third, we see from Table 3.2 substantial cross-country variation in the
estimated autoregressive dynamics once countries cross their current account deficit or sur-
plus thresholds. For deficit adjustment episodes, the estimated autoregressive coefficients
range from 0.827 for Germany to 0.973 for the US. For surplus adjustment episodes, the
estimated autoregressive coefficients range from 0.777 in the UK to 0.944 in Italy.
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HALF LIFE OF DISPLACEMENT FROM DEFICIT THRESHOLD (IN QUARTERS)
1 percent 2 percent 3 percent
Canada 1.14 2.49 3.30
France 2.84 4.08 4.79
Germany 3.65 3.64 3.64
Italy 3.18 3.84 4.13
Japan 4.79 5.48 5.69
UK 9.41 9.41 9.41
G6 Avg 4.17 4.82 5.16
Us 6.25 9.99 12.49
HALF LIFE OF DISPLACEMENT FROM SURPLUS THRESHOLD (IN QUARTERS)
Canada 3.07 4.58 5.48
France 2.43 3.88 4.84
Germany 1.09 1.81 2.32
Italy 12.03 12.03 12.03
Japan 3.29 4.50 5.13
UK 1.09 1.56 1.82
G6 Avg 3.83 4.72 5.27
Us 1.77 2.82 3.53
Table 3.3: Half Life of Displacement
In the top panel of Table 3.3, we compute the half life of 1 , 2, and 3 percent of net
output displacements of the current account imbalance from the deficit threshold. In our
equilibrium threshold model the speed of adjustment to a given displacement from the
deficit (or surplus) threshold is a function of the distance between the imbalances and the
unconditional mean, not just to the threshold itself (as for example would be the case for a
so called band threshold model). As is evident from the table, the US stands out in terms
of the slow speed of adjustment to current account deficits, even when it is adjusting. For
example, in response to a 2 percent of GDP displacement of the US current account from
the estimated deficit threshold of -2.18 percent (to a deficit of -4.18 percent of net output), it
takes the US nearly 10 quarters on average to close 1 percentage point of that displacement,
whereas for the average G6 country (G7 minus US), it takes fewer than 5 quarters to close
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such a displacement. In the bottom panel of Table 3.3, we compute the half life of 1, 2,
and 3 percent of net output displacements of the current account imbalance from the upper
(surplus) threshold. As before, we estimate substantial cross-country variation in the speeds
of adjustment to displacements of the current account away from the adjustment thresholds.
Note that the US actually adjusts faster than the G6 average to current account surpluses.
PERCENT OF SAMPLE SPENT IN EACH REGIME
CANADA FRANCE GERMANY ITALY JAPAN UK G6 AVG US
SURPLUS 34 23 20 51 36 37 34 20
INERTIA 48 35 20 3 30 17 25 63
DEFICIT 18 42 60 46 34 46 41 17
ADJUSTMENT PER QUARTER DURING  ADJUSTMENT REGIMES
(Measured from peak and as percent of net output)
CANADA FRANCE GERMANY ITALY JAPAN UK G6 AVG US
SURPLUS 0.687 0.507 1.081 0.467 0.336 0.644 0.620333 0.303
DEFICIT 0.604 0.246 0.693 0.575 0.361 0.612 0.515167 0.327
Table 3.4: Summary Statistics
In Table 3.4, we present some summary statistics for the three current account regimes es-
timated for each G7 country. We see that the average G6 (excluding the US) country spent
only roughly 25 percent of the 1979- 2003 sample in the inertia regime and thus spent 75
percent of the sample adjusting to either current account surpluses (34 percent of the sam-
ple) or deficits (41 percent of the sample). Of course, there is cross-country variation, but
the G6 country spending the maximum time in the inertia regime was Canada, which spent
48 percent of sample in the inertia regime. The US, by contrast, spent a full 63 percent
of the sample in the inertia regime, and only 17 percent of the sample adjusting to current
account deficits, and 20 percent of the time adjusting to current account surpluses. The
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bottom panel of Table 3.4 reports, for each country, the average adjustment per quarter
that actually occurred during the sample (as a percentage of net output) when that country
was estimated to be in a deficit adjustment regime or a surplus adjustment regime. These
adjustments are measured from the peak current account imbalance reached during the ad-
justment episode to the level reached when the adjustment regime concludes. Thus, for the
average G6 country, once current account deficits (relative to mean) peak and begin to con-
tract, they adjust at an average rate of 0.51 percent of net output per quarter (2 percent of
net output per year) until adjustment concludes with the current account imbalance crossing
the deficit adjustment threshold. The table also shows that for the G6, on average, once cur-
rent account surpluses peak and begin to contract, they adjust at an even faster average rate
0.62 percent of net output per quarter (2.4 percent of net output per year) until adjustment
concludes with the current account imbalance crossing the surplus adjustment threshold.
Evidently, adjustment of current account imbalances in the US data is much more sluggish
than the G6 average, with the US current account imbalance falling by roughly 0.3 per-
cent of net output during each quarter (1.2 percent per year) that the US is in an adjustment
regime.
To summarize the results of this Section, having tested and found evidence of non-
linearity in G7 current account adjustment data, we estimated for each G7 country a thresh-
old autoregressive model which allows for asymmetric, country-specific thresholds, coun-
try specific means, and regime and country specific speeds of adjustment. We find evidence
in favor of deficit as well as surplus thresholds for most countries, as well as evidence
of substantial cross-country differences in the amount of time spent in the three different
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regimes, as well as in the pace at which adjustments occur. Compared with other G7 coun-
tries, the US has large thresholds of current account adjustment, spends relatively little
time in adjustment regimes, and adjusts slowly even when in those imbalance adjustment
regimes. In the next section of the chapter, we explore what happens to the probability
distributions of exchange rates, stock prices, and interest rate differentials during current
account adjustment regimes in each country.
3.4 Exchange Rates, Stock Prices, and Interest Rates During
Current Account Adjustment Regimes
In this section, we investigate what happens to the probability distributions of nominal ex-
change rate changes, stock price index changes, and long term interest rate differentials
during the various current account adjustment regimes that we estimate for each country
in Section 3. The motivation is to determine whether or not crossing the current account
adjustment threshold is itself associated with shifts in the probability distributions for ex-
change rates, stock prices, and interest differentials. We specifically account for – and allow
for current account regime specific shifts in – autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
as well as for shifts in the mean by estimating GARCH models for nominal exchange rate
changes, stock prices changes, and interest differentials. We also in this section explore,
for the US, whether or not the expectation of a future adjustment in the current account im-
balance is associated with a present shift in the probability distribution for exchange rates,
stock prices, or interest differentials.
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Switching models of exchange rates were introduced in Engel and Hamilton (1990).
They hypothesized that the log difference in the nominal exchange rate is a stochastic
process with a regime-specific mean and a regime specific (but constant) variance. In their
model, the regimes themselves are unobservable states; the probability that the exchange
rate is in a particular regime is inferred from the exchange rate data itself. Our approach is
different, but similarly motivated. Having found evidence of three regimes of current ac-
count adjustment for each G7 country, we estimate and test whether or not being in a current
account adjustment regime is associated with shifts in the drift and variance of exchange
rate changes for that country. We allow for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity
in exchange rate changes. We estimate similar models for the log difference in stock price
changes and for long term interest rate differentials, allowing for regime specific drifts and
variances.
The GARCH models we estimate in this section are of the form
∆t = d+ d1DUMSt + d2DUMDt + ut (3.12)
σ2t = c+ au
2
t−1 + bσ
2
t−1 + c1DUMSt + c2DUMDt
where DUMDt is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 when a country is
in a deficit adjustment regime, DUMSt is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1
when a country is in a surplus adjustment regime, σ2t is the conditional variance of ut,
and ∆t is the log difference in the exchange rate, the log difference in the equity price
index, or the interest rate differential (adjusted for first order autocorrelation) observed at
a monthly frequency. Thus, in each quarter in which a country is in a particular regime,
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there will be three observations on the monthly change in the asset price during that quarter.
Because Italy and France were part of the EMS during most of the sample, the behavior of
their exchange rates and interest rates reflected their EMS commitments to stabilize their
exchange rates vis-a-vis Germany. We exclude them from the analysis of this section.
Estimation is by maximum likelihood. For each country, we report the results for the log
(change) in the trade weighted exchange rate, the (log change) in a broad stock market
index, and the differential between each county’s long term interest rate and G7 average
(adjusted for first order autocorrelation). When significant, we also report the results for
key bilateral exchange rates. In what follows ‘*’ indicates significance at the 5 percent
level, ‘**’ significance at the 10 percent level, and ‘***’ at the 15 percent level. Data
sources are the IFS for long-term interest rates and Bloomberg for exchange rates and
stock market indices. The sample is monthly from 1979:2 to 2003:9 with some exceptions
as noted below.
3.4.1 Results
US RESULTS
For the US dollar index, we see that the estimated coefficient on the surplus regime
dummy is positive and the estimated coefficient on the deficit regime dummy is negative
(Figure 3.1). This means that the dollar index tends to appreciate during US surplus ad-
justment regimes, and to depreciate during US deficit adjustment regimes, although the
coefficients are not measured precisely. For the pound, we estimate a statistically signifi-
cant shift in the probability distribution of exchange rate changes that coincides with US
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surplus adjustment regimes, in favor of an appreciation of the dollar relative to the pound.
For the Canadian dollar, we estimate a statistically significant shift in the probability dis-
tribution of exchange rate changes that coincides with US deficit adjustment regimes, in
favor of a depreciation of the dollar relative to the Canadian dollar. We also estimate a
statistically significant rise in the volatility of the Canadian dollar exchange rate that coin-
cides with US deficit adjustment regimes. For US equity prices, we estimate a significant
(at the 12 percent level) fall in equity returns during US current account deficit adjustment
regimes. We also estimate a significant rise in equity volatility that occurs during US cur-
rent account adjustment regimes. For long term interest rate differentials, we do estimate a
significant increase in volatility during US current account surplus adjustment regimes.
JAPANESE RESULTS
For the Yen index, we see that the estimated coefficient on the Japan current account
surplus adjustment regime dummy is positive and significant, indicating that the Yen in-
dex tends to appreciate during Japan’s current account surplus adjustment regimes (Figure
3.2). For the Dollar-Yen exchange rate, we estimate a statistically significant increase in
exchange rate volatility during both Japan surplus adjustment regimes and Japan deficit ad-
justment regimes. We also obtain point estimates that suggest that the yen tends to appreci-
ate relative to the dollar during Japanese current account surplus regimes and to depreciate
during Japanese current account deficit adjustment regimes, although these coefficients are
not measured precisely. For Japanese equity prices, we estimate a significant fall in equity
volatility during Japan current account deficit adjustment regimes. For long term interest
rate differentials, we do estimate a significant increase in volatility during both Japan’s cur-
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rent account surplus adjustment regimes and current account deficit adjustment regimes.
We also estimate a significant widening in Japanese long term interest differential (it be-
comes larger in absolute value) during Japan’s current account surplus adjustment regimes,
as well as a widening during Japan’s current account deficit adjustment regimes (although
the latter is not significant).
GERMAN RESULTS
For the volatility of the DM index through 1998:12, we see that the estimated co-
efficient on the German current account deficit adjustment regime dummy is positive and
significant (Figure 3.3). For the Dollar-DM exchange rate estimated through 1998:12, we
estimate a statistically significant depreciation of the DM during German current account
deficit adjustment regimes. For German equity prices, we estimate a significant fall in eq-
uity volatility during German current account deficit adjustment regimes. For long- term
interest rate differentials, we do estimate a significant increase in volatility during German
current account deficit adjustment regimes. German interest rate differentials increase in
absolute value during deficit adjustment regimes in before unification, and narrow after uni-
fication. We split the sample at unification because of an obvious shift in the mean of the
interest differential series at that time.
UK AND CANADIAN RESULTS
For the Canadian dollar index, we see that the estimated coefficient on the Canadian
current account deficit adjustment regime dummy is negative and significant, indicating
that the CAD index tends to depreciate during Canada’s current account deficit adjustment
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regimes (Figure 3.4). For the US Dollar-Canada exchange rate, we estimate a similar result
but it is not statistically significant. For the UK, the most noteworthy result is a signifi-
cant increase in equity returns during current account surplus adjustment regimes, a fall in
equity volatility during UK current account surplus adjustment regimes, and a rise in eq-
uity volatility during UK current account deficit adjustment regimes (Figure 3.5). Because
of a break in the UK equity price data series at 1984:1, the UK equity sample is 1984:1 -
2003:9.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In this subsection, we have reported evidence of statistically significant shifts in the
mean and variance of the probability distribution of several G7 exchange rates, equity
prices, and interest rate differentials that occur in conjunction the current account adjust-
ment regimes estimated in section 3. Our approach cannot answer the question of which
triggers what, but we do find evidence that regimes of current account adjustment do co-
incide with shifts in the distribution of some important asset prices. The estimates that are
significant tend to show exchange rate depreciation during current account deficit regimes
and exchange rate appreciation during current account surplus regimes. We also find sta-
tistically significant increases in exchange rate volatility during current account deficit ad-
justment regimes for the US, Japan, and Germany. For equity markets, we estimate that
current account deficit adjustment regimes are associated with significantly lower US eq-
uity returns and higher US equity volatility, while in the UK, equity returns are higher
during current account surplus adjust regimes, equity volatility is lower, while UK equity
volatility is higher during current account deficit adjustment regimes.
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     Asset Prices During US Current Account Adjustment Regimes
US Dollar Index
Δ t    =   -.0004  +  .0035DUMS t -  .0028DUMD t + u t
                       (.0028)                 (.0025)
σ 2 t   =    .0001  - .0325 u2t-1  +  .5976σ 2 t-1   +  .00002DUMSt -  .00002 DUMDt
                                                                                        (.00003)              (.00003)
         Pound per Dollar
Δ t    =   -.0013  +  .0101DUMS t -   .0019DUMD t + u t
                        (.0044)*              (.0038)
σ 2 t   =    .0002  + .2151 u2t-1  +  .6013σ 2 t-1   +  .0001DUMSt -  .00002 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.0001)                (.00007)
Canadian Dollars per US Dollar
Δ t    =   .0009  +  .0006DUMS t -   .0044DUMD t + u t
                        (.0019)               (.0025)**
σ 2 t   =    .0002 -  .0161 u2t-1  - .5754σ 2 t-1   +  .00001DUMSt +  .0002 DUMDt
                                                                                        (.0001)               (.00007)*
Equity Prices
Δ t    =   .0107  -  .0029DUMS t -   .0139DUMD t + u t
                        (.0061)              (.0091)***
σ 2 t   =    .0014  + .0004 u2t-1  +  .0681σ 2 t-1   +  .00027DUMSt +  .00223 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.0004)                (.0011)*
Long Term Interest Differentials
Δ t    =   .0094  -  .0154DUMS t -   .0014DUMD t + u t
                        (.0304)              (.0181)
σ 2 t   =    .0002  -  .0177 u2t-1  +  .9788σ 2 t-1   +  .00305DUMSt +  .00007 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.0009)*               (.00014)
Figure 3.1: Asset Prices During US Current Account Adjustment
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Asset Prices During Japan Current Account Adjustment Regimes
Yen Index
Δ t    =   -.0016 +  .0093DUMS t +  .0005DUMD t + u t
                       (.0034)*              (.0031)
σ 2 t   =    .0006  - .2115 u2t-1  -  .2848σ 2 t-1   +  .00012DUMSt -  .00005 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.00013)              (.00012)
         Dollar per Yen
Δ t    =   .0008  +  .0066DUMS t -  .0044DUMD t + u t
                        (.0050)              (.0048)
σ 2 t   =    .00001 -  .0095 u2t-1  +  .9383σ 2 t-1   +  .00012DUMSt +  .00008 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.00005)*              (.00003)*
Equity Prices
Δ t    =  -.0031 +  .0105DUMS t +   .0093DUMD t + u t
                       (.0084)              (.0076)
σ 2 t   =    .0006  + .1245 u2t-1  +  .7605σ 2 t-1   -  .00017DUMSt -  .00044 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0003)                (.00029)***
Long Term Interest Differentials
Δ t    =  -.1045  -  .0153DUMS t -   .0844DUMD t + u t
                        (.0344)              (.0371)*
σ 2 t   =    .0049  +  .0082 u2t-1  -  .1245σ 2 t-1   +  .028796DUMSt +  .03240 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0142)*               (.01493)*
Figure 3.2: Asset Prices During Japan Current Account Adjustment
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     Asset Prices During German Current Account Adjustment Regimes
DM  Index
Δ t    =    .0021 -  .0013DUMS t -  .0012DUMD t + u t
                       (.0014)               (.0012)
σ 2 t   =    .00002 + .0886 u2t-1 +  .1619σ 2 t-1   +  .00001DUMSt +  .00003 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.00001)              (.00001)*
         Dollar per DM
Δ t    = - .0058  -  .0013DUMS t -  .0082DUMD t + u t
                        (.0066)              (.0053)***
σ 2 t   =    .00127 +  .0921 u2t-1  -  .2801σ 2 t-1   -  .00004DUMSt +  .00008 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0004)                (.00031)
Equity Prices
Δ t    =   .0037 -  .0025DUMS t +   .0053DUMD t + u t
                       (.0144)              (.0102)
σ 2 t   =    .0015  + .0726 u2t-1  +  .7386σ 2 t-1   -  .00026DUMSt -  .00115 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0006)                (.00051)*
Long Term Interest Differentials
1979:1 – 1990:12
Δ t    =  -.0129  -  .0282DUMS t -   .2147DUMD t + u t
                        (.0481)              (.0541)*
σ 2 t   =    .0242  +  .2351 u2t-1  -  .0644σ 2 t-1   +  .01303DUMSt +  .03635 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0122)                (.02499)***
1991:1 – 1998:12
Δ t    =   .0074  -  .0619DUMS t -   .0358DUMD t + u t
                        (.0927)              (.0247)***
σ 2 t   =   -.0001  +  .0804 u2t-1  +  .7183σ 2 t-1   +  .01583DUMSt +  .00455 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0152)                (.00294)***
Figure 3.3: Asset Prices During German Current Account Adjustment
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     Asset Prices During UK Current Account Adjustment Regimes
Pound  Index
Δ t    =   -.0013 +  .0012DUMS t +  .0019DUMD t + u t
                       (.0029)               (.0028)
σ 2 t   =    .00011 + .2775 u2t-1 +  .5646σ 2 t-1   -  .00007DUMSt -  .00008 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.00005)***         (.00005)**
   
Dollar per Pound
Δ t    =  .0049   -  .0093DUMS t -  .0035DUMD t + u t
                        (.0044)*             (.0045)
σ 2 t   =    .00024 +  .1959 u2t-1  +  .5747σ 2 t-1   -  .00004DUMSt +  .00001 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0001)                (.0001)
Equity Prices
Δ t    =  - .0006 +  .0185DUMS t +   .0048DUMD t + u t
                       (.0082)*               (.0081)
σ 2 t   =    .0040  + .0224 u2t-1  - .8964σ 2 t-1   -  .00084DUMSt +  .00091 DUMDt
                                                                                        (.0003)*               (.00070)
Long Term Interest Differentials
Δ t    =   .0312  +  .0073DUMS t +   .0177DUMD t + u t
                        (.032)                 (.028)
σ 2 t   =    .00037  +  .0461 u2t-1  +  .9402σ 2 t-1   +  .00048DUMSt -  .00037 DUMDt
                                                                                            (.0018)                (.0012)
Figure 3.4: Asset Prices During UK Current Account Adjustment
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     Asset Prices During Canada Current Account Adjustment Regimes
CAD  Index
Δ t    =    .0002 -  .0015DUMS t -  .0025DUMD t + u t
                       (.0014)             (.0017)***
σ 2 t   =    .00004 + .1961 u2t-1 +  .4708σ 2 t-1   -  .000002DUMSt +  .000002 DUMDt
                                                                                         (.00001)              (.00002)
   
US Dollar per Canadian Dollar
Δ t    =   .0003  -  .0018DUMS t -  .0021DUMD t + u t
                       (.0014)                (.0018)
σ 2 t   =    .00001 +  .0608 u2t-1  +  .8727σ 2 t-1   +  .00004DUMSt +  .00002 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.00006)               (.00005)
Equity Prices
Δ t    =   .0051 +  .0030DUMS t -   .0030DUMD t + u t
                       (.0067)                 (.0065)
σ 2 t   =    .0007  + .0534 u2t-1  + .7576σ 2 t-1   -  .00041DUMSt -  .00062 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0002)***         (.00047)
Long Term Interest Differentials
Δ t    =   .1855  -  .0429DUMS t +   .0300DUMD t + u t
                        (.0605)              (.0331)
σ 2 t   =    .0124  +  .1002 u2t-1  +  .6336σ 2 t-1   +  .05082DUMSt +  .00013 DUMDt
                                                                                          (.0033)***           (.00396)
Figure 3.5: Asset Prices During Canada Current Account Adjustment
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3.4.2 Do Expectations of Future US Current Account Adjustment
Trigger Adjustment in Present Asset Prices?
We now explore, for the US, whether or not the expectation of a future adjustment in the
current account imbalance is associated with a present shift in the probability distribution
for exchange rates, stock prices, or interest differentials. As discussed previously, com-
pared with other G7 countries, the US has wide thresholds of current account adjustment,
spends relatively little time in adjustment regimes, and – as shown in Table 3.4 – adjusts
slowly even when in deficit or surplus adjustment regimes. To capture the hypothesis that
expectations of future current account adjustment may have an impact on present asset
prices, we augment our basic GARCH specification to include two additional dummy vari-
ables. Let DUMBD equal one when −2.18 < ca < −1 and let DUMBS equal one
when 1 < ca < 2.15. Thus DUMBD equals one when the current account deficit is more
than one percentage point below its mean but still less (in absolute value) than the deficit
threshold, while DUMBD equals one when the current account is more than one percent-
age point above its mean but still less (in absolute value) than the surplus threshold. Our
specification becomes
∆t = d+ d1DUMSt + d2DUMDt + d3DUMBSt + d4DUMBDt + ut (3.13)
σ2t = c+ au
2
t−1 + bσ
2
t−1 + c1DUMSt + c2DUMDt + c3DUMBSt + c4DUMBDt
In order to focus on significant results, we proceed in two steps. In the first step, we
estimate specification (3). In the second step, we drop any dummy variable that in the first
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stage estimate is not significant at the 15 percent level or better. The results are reported in
Figure 3.6.
Asset Prices Before and During US Current Account Adjustment Regimes
US Dollar Index
Δ t    =    .0006  -  .0064DUMBD t + u t
                                    (.0033)**
σ 2 t   =    .00012  - .05 u2t-1  +  .7083σ 2 t-1   -  .00006DUMBSt
                                                                                                     (.00003)*
Equity Prices
Δ t    =   .0115  -   .0131DUMD t + u t
                                     (.0087)***
σ 2 t   =    .0015  + .0058 u2t-1  +  .1106σ 2 t-1   -  .0007DUMBSt +  .0019 DUMDt
                                                                                        (.0003)*                 (.00097)*
Long Term Interest Differentials
Δ t    =  -.0020  +  .0384DUMBS t
                                        (.0194)*
σ 2 t   =    .0003  +  .0241 u2t-1  +  .9418σ 2 t-1
Figure 3.6: Asset Prices Before and During US Current Account Adjustment Regimes
From Figure 3.6, we see that when current account deficits are large but before the US
enters a current account deficit adjustment regime, the dollar index starts to depreciate, at
a pace of roughly 7 percent per year. We also see that the volatility of the dollar index is
lower when deficits are small but before the US enters a current account surplus adjustment
regime. As for equity prices, the results reported in Figure 3.1 are robust to the inclusion
of the two additional dummy variables. We continue to find a significant negative effect
of current account deficit adjustment regimes on equity returns, and a significant positive
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effect on equity volatility. Interestingly, we also find that equity volatility is lower when
deficits are small but before they have entered a current account surplus adjustment regime.
Finally, we see that long-term interest differentials in favor of the US are larger when
current account deficits are small.
3.5 Assessing the Present US Current Account Deficit
In this section we draw on our empirical results to take stock of the present US current ac-
count deficit. Our empirical results indicate that compared to other G7 countries, the US
over our sample exhibited relatively wide thresholds within which current account adjust-
ment is absent and relatively slow speeds of adjustment once these thresholds, especially
the deficit threshold, are crossed. Moreover, the present US current account deficit sub-
stantially exceeds – and has for some time – our estimated thresholds of current account
deficit adjustment for the US. We explore several possible explanations. The first is that
the threshold model, while a useful description of current account adjustment for other G7
countries, does not apply to the US and that the present deficit of nearly 6 percent of GDP
is in fact sustainable. The second explanation is that there are thresholds of current account
adjustment for the US, but that adjustment has been delayed over the past several years,
due to unusual circumstances that were not in evidence during the sample over which the
models were estimated, 1979-2003. These circumstances could include: (i) the low level
of global real interest rates (which support higher levels of investment and lower levels of
saving in the US than would be the case with historically average or above average real in-
terest rates); (ii) the more muted and less uniform decline in the dollar than occurred, for
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example during the 1985 - 1987 Plaza-Louvre episode (reflecting the intervention activities
of Asian central banks); (iii) the fact that the US continues to run a substantial surplus in
dividends, interest, and profits on its stock of foreign assets compared with the dividends,
interest, and profits that is pays out on its much larger stock of foreign liabilities; (iv) the
adjustment in the net foreign liability position of the US that occurs as a result of dollar
depreciation (which in 2003 offset almost 80 percent of that years current account deficit).
We review and evaluate these potential explanations for the absence of adjustment to date
in the US current account deficit even though it has passed well beyond the thresholds that
would have triggered adjustments in other G7 countries. We begin by reviewing the data
on the US net foreign liability position.
Almost all claims held by foreigners against the US are dollar denominated, while
US claims against the rest of the world are denominated in foreign currency. Thus, as
has been emphasized by Pierre Olivier Gourinchas and Helene Rey, a real depreciation of
the dollar, by increasing the real value of US holdings of foreign assets relative to foreign
holdings of US assets (which of course are dollar denominated liabilities of the US) is an
important channel of international adjustment, over and above the impact of said real de-
preciation on the trade balance. This channel operates by narrowing the gap between the
market value of foreign claims against the US and the market value of US claims against
the rest of the world. In effect, because of the willingness on the part of the rest of the
world to lend to the US in the form of dollar denominated debt and equity instruments,
there is a transfer of wealth to the US from the rest of the world as result of a real depreci-
ation of the dollar, all other things – including other asset prices – equal, a qualification to
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which we return below. It is important to note that while the US benefits from this ‘trans-
fer’ effect which increases the real value of US assets relative to US liabilities, there is of
course another implication of real dollar depreciation which is the terms of trade deteriora-
tion that results from it. This terms of trade deterioration lowers the real purchasing power
of any given flow of US income, and it increases the relative price of imported inputs to US
based production. In addition, as Obstfeld and Rogoff have emphasized, moving toward
current account sustainability requires that resources be shifted from non tradable to trad-
able production. Empirically, this channel of international adjustment is potentially quite
important in complementing the traditional channel in which the factors that contribute to
a narrowing of the current account deficit also result in a real depreciation of the dollar.
Every year, the US Commerce Department reports data on the net foreign liability
position of the US, and it provides detail on the revaluation of US assets and liabilities that
occurs as a result of exchange rate movements, as well as asset price changes. The data
on net foreign assets and liabilities is subject to substantial revisions. However, until quite
recently – April 2005 – the Commerce Department did not go back and revise the exchange
rate and asset price revaluation attributions to make them consistent with the revised data
on foreign assets and liabilities. However, the Commerce Department has now revised
the exchange rate and asset price revaluation attributions to make them consistent with the
revised data on foreign assets and liabilities. The newly released data are reported in Table
3.5 and they tell an interesting story.
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Table 3.5: Components of Change in Net International Investment Position
We begin with the most recent data available as of the time of writing, for year end 2003
(data for end 2004 are preliminary). The US began 2003 with gross foreign assets of $6.6
trillion and gross foreign liabilities of $9.2, for a stock of net foreign liabilities of $2.6
trillion. During that year the US ran a current account deficit of $530 billion which, af-
ter adjustment for errors and omissions, resulted in a net capital inflow of $560 billion.
In a simple textbook model which abstracts from asset price or exchange rate changes,
this should have resulted in a dollar-for-dollar increase in net foreign liabilities, to approx-
imately $3 trillion. During that year, asset price changes in local currency terms were
substantial, but they roughly canceled out, having a minimal impact on the net foreign lia-
bilities of the US. By contrast, the exchange rate valuation effects were substantial. Dollar
depreciation that year increased the value of US assets abroad by $416 billion. By year end
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2003, the net foreign liabilities of the US were valued at $2.4 trillion dollars, an increase of
only $83 billion compared with the previously discussed US capital inflow of $560 billion.
Of course, a real dollar depreciation has a one-off impact on the value of US net for-
eign assets, and a stabilization of net foreign liabilities as a ratio of US GDP will require a
reduction in the ratio of the current account to GDP. However, the current account deficit
to GDP ratio need not return to zero for sustainability to be achieved. Indeed, a US cur-
rent account deficit to GDP ratio in the range of 2 to 3 percent is probably consistent with
sustainability at something like the global level of interest rates and equity valuations. Con-
sider this fact: in 2001, US net foreign liabilities were 22.8 percent of US nominal GDP.
Two years later, US net foreign liabilities to GDP had risen by a very modest 1.3 percent-
age points, to 24.1 percent of GDP, notwithstanding current account deficits of roughly 5
percent of GDP in each of 2002 and 2003. The data in Table 3.5 show that exchange rate
valuation effects have been important in previous years. For example, in 2002, the ex-
change rate revaluation of US foreign assets offset 46 percent of the foreign capital inflow;
in 1994 and 1995, the exchange rate valuation effect offset 52% of the net capital inflow.
Of course, exchange rate appreciation has the opposite effect. Of the $1.3 trillion rise in
US net foreign liabilities that accumulated in the three years 1999-2001, $549 billion , or
43 percent, was due to the valuation impact of the appreciation of the dollar that occurred
during those years.
Another factor that should be considered when thinking about sustainability and ad-
justment of international imbalances is the longstanding evidence for the US of substantial
differences in the rates of return that US investors earn on their foreign investments com-
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pared with the rate of return that foreign investors earn and require on their investments in
the US. That is, even though the US is, and has been for many years, the world’s largest
‘net debtor’, with net foreign liabilities estimated to be some $2.4 trillion dollars at year
end 2003, the US still to this day earns more interest and dividends on its foreign assets
than it pays out on its foreign liabilities, even though the latter exceed the former by more
than 2 trillion dollars. Specifically, for 2004, income receipts on US assets abroad totaled
$366 billion while income payments on foreign assets in the US totaled $344 billion. How
can the US continue to run a surplus on international investment income with its large stock
of international liabilities? Differences in portfolio composition can probably account for
some of this. For example, in recent years 60 percent of US assets abroad were invested
in foreign equities and foreign direct investment. By contrast, only 40 percent of foreign
claims against the US were invested in US equities and direct investment. However, in or-
der to account for the persistent surplus in the US international investment income account,
portfolio composition is probably not sufficient. In addition, it is likely the case that the US
earns consistent higher returns on its FDI than the rest of the world earns on its US FDI.
1989 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Portfolio Shares
 Private US Investment Abroad
         FDI 39.7% 36.8% 36.4% 38.4% 39.6% 37.5% 34.6% 32.0% 35.9%
         Securities and Currency 15.0% 32.5% 34.0% 34.6% 35.2% 33.2% 31.6% 29.0% 32.6%
         Other Private Assets 45.3% 30.7% 29.6% 27.1% 25.2% 29.3% 33.7% 39.0% 31.5%
Private Foreign Investment in the US
         FDI 26.0% 28.0% 30.7% 34.3% 37.4% 35.0% 31.5% 25.5% 26.9%
         Securities and Currency 34.9% 40.9% 42.5% 42.1% 40.6% 41.0% 42.6% 44.6% 47.0%
         Other Private Assets 39.1% 31.1% 26.8% 23.6% 22.0% 24.0% 25.9% 30.0% 26.0%
Table 3.6: Portfolio Shares
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We see that in both 2003 and 2004, the US earned high returns on FDI, earning profits
of 8.7 percent of FDI assets at market value in 2004 and 9.2 percent of FDI assets at mar-
ket value in 2003. By contrast, foreign owned direct investment assets in the US earned 4.3
percent of assets at market value in 2004 and 3.4 percent of assets at market value in 2003.
This disparity is not a recent phenomenon. As the Table shows, the US has consistently
since 1989 – the year the US net foreign asset position turned negative – earned higher re-
turns on its FDI assets than foreigners have earned on their US investments. The Table also
reports the rate of return on non-FDI assets and liabilities. The absolute return differentials
are much smaller, and are consistently negative, indicating that foreign non-FDI holdings
pay slightly higher returns than US non-FDI holdings. Once we take into account the dif-
ferences in portfolio composition between US assets abroad and foreign assets in the US
(reported in Table 3.7), we obtain the time series on the total return differential reported in
Table 3.6.
3.5 Assessing the Present US Current Account Deficit 84
1989 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
US owned assets abroad
Total Assets 2,350,235 3,964,558 5,379,128 6,174,518 7,390,427 7,393,643 6,898,707 6,613,320 7,863,968
US Private Assets 2,094,878 3,703,433 5,158,094 5,941,744 7,169,782 7,180,075 6,683,092 6,369,409 7,595,619
        FDI Assets 832,460 1,363,792 1,879,285 2,279,601 2,839,639 2,694,014 2,314,934 2,039,780 2,730,289
        Foreign Securities 314,294 1,203,925 1,751,183 2,052,995 2,525,341 2,385,353 2,114,734 1,846,879 2,474,374
        Other US Private Assets 948,124 1,135,716 1,527,626 1,609,148 1,804,802 2,100,708 2,253,424 2,482,750 2,390,956
Income Receipts
Total Receipts 160270 208065 254534 258871 290474 347614 283761 263861 291354 365886
FDI Receipts 61981 95260 115323 103963 131626 151839 128665 147291 187522 237564
Returns on US owned assets abroad
Return on all Assets 8.0% 6.3% 5.5% 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 3.8% 3.8% 4.4% 4.7%
Return on FDI 9.0% 8.5% 7.2% 5.5% 5.8% 5.3% 4.8% 6.4% 9.2% 8.7%
Return on non-FDI assets 7.5% 5.1% 4.6% 4.4% 4.1% 4.3% 3.3% 2.5% 2.3% 2.5%
Foreign-owned assets in the US
Total Liabilities 2,397,222 4,270,394 6,201,860 7,249,895 8,437,115 8,982,199 9,206,868 9,166,727 10,514,958
Liabilities to Private Foreigners2,055,476 3,587,521 5,328,144 6,353,721 7,486,027 7,951,491 8,124,572 7,954,004 9,040,797
         FDI Liabilities 534,734 1,005,726 1,637,408 2,179,035 2,798,193 2,783,235 2,560,294 2,025,345 2,435,539
         Securities and Currency (Cash, US 716,523 1,466,328 2,262,490 2,675,016 3,042,633 3,260,616 3,459,610 3,545,585 4,251,500
         Other Liabilities to Private Foreigne 804,219 1,115,467 1,428,246 1,499,670 1,645,201 1,907,640 2,104,668 2,383,074 2,353,758
Income Receipts
Total Payments -141463 -189353 -244195 -257554 -280037 -329864 -263120 -259626 -261106 -344925
FDI Payments -7045 -30318 -42950 -38418 -53437 -56910 -12783 -46460 -68657 -105252
Returns on US owned assets abroad
Return on all Liabilities 7.1% 5.5% 4.9% 4.2% 3.9% 3.9% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 3.3%
Return on FDI 1.8% 4.0% 3.5% 2.3% 2.5% 2.0% 0.5% 1.8% 3.4% 4.3%
Return on non-FDI Liabilities 8.4% 5.9% 5.3% 4.8% 4.5% 4.8% 4.0% 3.2% 2.7% 3.0%
Return Differentials
Total 0.9% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% 1.6% 1.4%
FDI 7.2% 4.5% 3.7% 3.2% 3.3% 3.3% 4.3% 4.5% 5.8% 4.4%
Non-FDI -0.9% -0.8% -0.7% -0.4% -0.4% -0.5% -0.7% -0.7% -0.4% -0.5%
Table 3.7: US-owned Assets Abroad and Foreign-owned Assets in the US
Another factor that may have delayed adjustment in the US current account is the more
modest decline in the broad, real trade weighted dollar as compared with the decline in the
dollar that occurred during the 1985-1988. The Federal Reserve’s real broad trade weighted
dollar index is plotted in Figure 3.7.
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US real broad trade weighted dollar index
 (% decline from February 1985 to November 1988 vs February 2002 to November 2005)
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Figure 3.7: Trends in the US Real Effective Exchange Rate
In the three years after the dollar’s peak in early 1985, the broad dollar index declined by
30 percent. By contrast, in the three years since the dollar’s recent peak in early 2002, it has
declined by less than 15 percent. Obviously, the intervention by Asian central banks has
limited the depreciation of the dollar against a number of significant US trading partners.
Our final point is that the US current account deficit is in part an endogenous, gen-
eral equilibrium outcome of global financial and macroeconomic integration. As such, we
believe it reflects a global excess supply of saving relative profitable investment opportu-
nities. In a world in which there is a global excess supply of saving relative to investment,
we would expect to find and indeed find today that global real interest rates are low and
that some country or group of countries must absorb the surplus of internationally mobile
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capital. Required real rates return - as measured by yields on TIPS25 in the US and in-
dexed gilts in the UK - are unusually low (below 2 percent as of this writing). In the late
90s, the opposite was the case and rapid (in retrospect unsustainable) world investment
rates surged ahead of savings, pushing up real interest rates (Tips yields were at 4 percent
in March 2000 when the bubble peaked). Although no one can say for sure how long the
present imbalance between global saving and investment will persist, it seems clear that
this global imbalance between saving and investment is contributing to the size of the US
current account deficit and its failure to adjust as May 2005.
3.6 Concluding remarks
Are there thresholds of current account adjustment? This chapter has reported evidence
in favour of this proposition. We found statistically significant evidence of differing ad-
justment dynamics in the current-account-to-net-output ratio for all of the G7 countries
examined. In particular, each country displayed three regimes — a surplus regime and
a deficit regime in which the current account tended to revert towards its long-run mean,
albeit at different speeds in each regime (showing that sign does indeed matter), and an
‘inertia regime’ in which, for intermediate levels of the current account balance between
the surplus and deficit regimes, current account adjustment was negligible (showing that
size also matters). We also showed, however, that one size does not fit all in the sense that
we found significant cross-country variation in the size of the estimated thresholds. We
25 Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities
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also found substantial cross-country variation in the estimated speed of adjustment once
countries cross their current account deficit or surplus thresholds.
Our results support the findings of Caroline Freund and Frank Warnock, by providing
econometric evidence on the nonlinearities and differences in current account adjustment
across industrial countries. In line with their results, countries with large deficits such
as the US exhibit relatively wide thresholds within which current account adjustment is
absent and relatively slow speeds of adjustment once these thresholds, especially the deficit
threshold, are crossed. While our analysis focuses on the relatively homogeneous post
Bretton-Woods period, Barry Eichengreen and Muge Adalet present an historical analysis
of current account reversals starting from the gold standard period and find evidence of
substantial differences in current account adjustments episodes also across time.
We also found evidence of statistically significant shifts in the mean and variance
of the probability distribution of several G7 exchange rates, equity prices, and interest
rate differentials that occur in conjunction with our estimated current account adjustment
regimes. In particular, we found a tendency towards exchange rate depreciation during cur-
rent account deficit regimes and exchange rate appreciation during current account surplus
regimes, and statistically significant increases in exchange rate volatility during current ac-
count deficit adjustment regimes for the US, Japan, and Germany. This suggests that a
multivariate approach involving the joint modeling of exchange rates and the current ac-
count within a nonlinear framework would be a fruitful exercise, as well as being consistent
with substantial evidence in favor of nonlinear adjustment in real exchange rates (see, e.g.,
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Obstfeld and Taylor (1997); Taylor and Taylor, 2004). This is an avenue we pursue in
chapter 5.
Chapter 4
The Savings and Investment Components of
Current Account Imbalances
4.1 Introduction
The analysis of the national income identity shows that a current account deficit can be
either determined by relatively low savings or high investment levels. The economic lit-
erature provides a rationale for the existence of current account deficits in emerging and
developing economies given the need of investment for development and growth in these
countries. Nevertheless, current global imbalances take place in the form of high deficits
in developed countries, notably the US, and surpluses in most emerging markets, such as
Asian countries, with substantial capital flows from emerging markets allowing to finance
the widening savings-investment gaps.
This chapter aims at disentangling the domestic components of current account im-
balances for a group of industrial countries, by highlighting the role of savings and in-
vestment on current account adjustment. The first part of the analysis looks at the main
stylized facts on private and public savings in G7 countries over the last two decades. We
investigate the degree of international capital mobility in these countries and the robustness
of the assumption of Ricardian equivalence. The second part of the chapter builds on the
methodology and results of chapter 3. In particular we apply the threshold autoregressive
methodology to a disaggregated analysis of the components of current account adjustment.
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4.2 Stylised facts on private and public savings in the G7
One possible approach for the analysis of current account imbalances is by looking at the
national income identity26. The study of the national income and product accounts allows
to disentangle the different causes of current account surplus/deficit, by highlighting the
relationship between public spending and the current account as well as between private
savings and investment. In particular, according to the national income identity,
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +Xt −Mt + rBt−1 (4.14)
where Y represents domestic income (GNP), C private consumption, I domestic invest-
ment, G government expenditure, X −M net exports and rB is net primary income from
abroad, in terms of foreign debt. It follows that the current account can be expressed as
Yt − (Ct + It +Gt) = Xt −Mt + rBt−1 = CAt (4.15)
If we now look at the national savings identities, we can identify private savings (SP )
as the difference between households’ disposable income and consumption, and public sav-
ings (SG) as the difference between government income and government spending. From
the national income identity, we can then derive a new definition for total savings and the
26 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1994) for a comprehensive textbook analysis of the topic.
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current account as follows:
St = SPt + S
G
t (4.16)
= (Yt − Tt − Ct) + (Tt −Gt) (4.17)
= Yt − Ct −Gt (4.18)
⇒ It + CAt (4.19)
Therefore, in an open economy, savings can be directed either to domestic capital stock
or to foreign wealth. Under this definition, the current account balance represents the net
foreign investment of the country. In real terms, this implies that excess domestic savings
will be matched by positive net exports to foreigners.
Table 4.1 provides a summary of these variables for each of the G7 countries and
pinpoints their behaviour across time. Data are presented as percentages of net output,
for comparison reasons. We identify surplus countries, such as Japan and Germany, as
well as deficit ones, such as the UK and the US. Most countries with a deficit ca position
at present show a decrease in private savings in the 2000-2003 period, with some sign of
recovery in the latest observations for 2004. In the case of the US, this trend has been partly
explained by the effect of high productivity prospects for the US vis-à-vis other countries
(along seminal work by Glick and Rogoff, 1995), by the steady decline of real interest rates
and by the wealth effect arising from the global equity market boom first and the real estate
one later (Kraay and Ventura, 2005). In terms of public savings, current account deficits
have been associated to government deficits for Italy, the UK and the US.
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Year (avgs) Public Savings Private Savings Investment
Current 
Account
Canada              1980-1989 -3.62 37.04 35.54 -2.12
1990-1999 -3.02 30.12 30.67 -3.57
2000-2003 5.19 30.64 31.95 3.88
2004 5.12 30.04 33.04 2.12
France 1980-1989 2.72 30.83 36.11 -2.56
1990-1999 0.59 33.98 32.95 1.62
2000-2003 7.67 28.90 33.32 3.25
2004 10.42 24.00 33.88 0.54
Germany 1980-1989 2.10 38.17 34.15 6.13
1990-1999 1.24 40.42 37.39 4.26
2000-2003 -0.50 34.63 30.73 3.39
2004 -2.04 36.10 26.88 7.19
Italy 1980-1989 -10.70 47.04 38.31 -1.97
1990-1999 -6.66 39.35 31.11 1.58
2000-2003 0.65 31.66 31.90 0.42
2004 -0.55 31.57 31.62 -0.60
Japan               1980-1989 10.08 45.47 51.81 3.74
1990-1999 10.40 45.18 51.20 4.39
2000-2003 4.12 44.01 43.02 5.12
2004 3.05 43.98 40.49 6.53
United Kingdom      1980-1989 7.20 21.95 30.73 -1.57
1990-1999 -1.43 26.13 27.00 -2.30
2000-2003 1.16 22.56 25.89 -2.17
2004 -1.76 27.00 25.69 -0.45
United States 1980-1989 -1.28 31.63 31.99 -1.65
1990-1999 0.22 26.03 27.55 -1.30
2000-2003 0.93 22.36 29.02 -5.73
2004 -2.57 24.61 30.33 -8.30
(% of Net Output)
Savings, Investment and Current Account in G7 Countries
Table 4.1: Savings, Investment and Current Account in G7 Countries
Before moving to a more formal analysis of current account adjustment, we want
to look at some of the assumptions behind the national income identity and the resulting
current account definitions. In particular, we want to investigate the degree of interna-
tional capital mobility in these countries and the robustness of the assumption of Ricardian
equivalence.
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The hypothesis of perfectly integrated capital markets would imply the absence of
correlation between domestic savings and investment and as a result between fiscal deficits
and investment levels. The seminal 1980 paper by Feldstein and Horioka and more recent
work in the literature27 highlight the weakness of this assumption. Evidence from OECD
and developing countries show a significant tendency for savings to be domestically in-
vested. Although the savings retention coefficient has decreased with time and changes
in the nature of capital markets, Feldstein(2005) indicates only a modest decline, once
countries’ GDP weight are accounted for. Among plausible explanations for this appar-
ent puzzle in presence of capital mobility, Obstfeld-Rogoff(1996) suggest the existence of
ca targeting strategies by national governments, limited access to capital markets by cor-
poration and therefore a strong impact of corporate savings on investment, the existence
of capital endowments close to steady state level of most advanced countries, endogeneity
issues related to demographic and productivity changes.
With reference to our country sample, we obtain partial equilibrium results in line
with the literature. In particular, we estimate the following simple OLS regressions:
It
Yt
= α+ βs
St
Yt
(4.20)
It
Yt
= α+ βGs
SGt
Yt
+ βPs
SPt
Yt
(4.21)
where βs represents the savings retention coefficient. Results in the first column of Ta-
ble 4.2 are based on the simple Feldstein-Horioka regression (4.20), while column two and
three report results for disaggregated values of savings according to equation (4.21). Esti-
27 See among others Mussa-Goldstein(1993), Obstfeld-Rogoff (2001), Stulz (2005) and Feldstein (2005).
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mates for the savings retention coefficient are around 0.50 for most G7 economies with the
exception of Italy and Japan (where the beta coefficients are found not significantly differ-
ent from 1 at 5% significance level). Although this value is lower than the 0.89 estimate
in the original Feldstein-Horioka work, it is still highly significant. Disaggregate savings
data, while showing different relationships between public/private savings and investment,
support these results. Furthermore, parameter estimates for βGs and β
P
s tend to be close in
value and, in particular, are not statistically different from each other for France and the US.
According to similar results by Feldstein and Bacchetta (1991), these estimates suggest a
crowding out effect of government deficits on investment.
βS βsG βsP
Canada              0.50** 0.40** 0.70**
(0.060) (0.059) (0.070)
France 0.51** 0.55** 0.46**
(0.111) (0.119) (0.121)
Germany 0.59** 1.07** 0.43**
(0.083) (0.164) (0.092)
Italy 1.14** 0.70** 0.96**
(0.090) (0.117) (0.087)
Japan               1.09** 1.09** 1.35**
(0.050) (0.048) (0.094)
United Kingdom      0.55** 0.54** 0.36**
(0.076) (0.074) (0.106)
United States 0.56** 0.60** 0.54**
(0.046) (0.042) (0.056)
Feldstein-Horioka Savings Retention Coefficients
Note: SE in parenthesis.**, * indicate significance at 1% and 5% level, respectively.
Table 4.2: Feldstein-Horioka Savings Retention Coefficients
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In addition, we find that cross-correlations between the private-savings series and the
public-savings one have a negative sign but a value lower than one, as reported in Table 4.3.
Under full Ricardian equivalence, a government should have no effect on overall savings
of the economy and just a temporary one in special cases, such as a debt financed increase
in spending. An increase of private savings would in fact match the reduced level of public
savings. The current account balance would be thus left unchanged. Our estimates suggest
a much weaker link between public and private savings and therefore imply a relaxation of
the Ricardian Equivalence and, as a result, account for the possibility of a twin deficit (both
public and external) fed by a deterioration of the fiscal stance. In particular, these conclu-
sions are consistent with the imperfect capital mobility results identified in the previous
analysis.
Lags: 0 1 2 3 4
Canada              -0.501 -0.413 -0.338 -0.285 -0.236
France -0.707 -0.650 -0.613 -0.566 -0.532
Germany 0.035 0.087 0.138 0.196 0.260
Italy -0.918 -0.882 -0.848 -0.810 -0.778
Japan               -0.481 -0.382 -0.288 -0.211 -0.148
United Kingdom      -0.737 -0.733 -0.731 -0.698 -0.637
United States -0.431 -0.442 -0.467 -0.471 -0.472
Cross-Correlations of Private and Public Savings
Table 4.3: Cross-correlations of Private and Public Savings
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4.3 Thresholds of current account adjustment
In chapter 3, we report evidence in favour of the existence of nonlinearities of current
account adjustment. We find statistically significant evidence of differing adjustment dy-
namics in the current-account-to-net-output ratio for all of the G7 countries. In particular,
we model the nonlinearities in the ca by means of an equilibrium threshold autoregressive
(TAR) model. The baseline specification used in the analysis is as follows:
cat = ρ×1{cat−d,δ} × cat−1+ρ×1{cat−d,δ} × cat−1 + (4.22)
+(1− 1{cat−d,δ})× (1− 1{cat−d,δ})× cat−1+et
where 1{cat−d, δ} is an indicator function that takes on a value of 1 when cat−d >
δ > 0 (and zero otherwise) and 1{cat−d, δ} is an indicator function that takes on a value of
1 when cat−d < δ 6 0 (and zero otherwise). This approach postulates that the persistence
of the current account imbalance in a country may depend upon whether or not the current
account imbalance has crossed a surplus ‘threshold’ of δ > 0 or a deficit threshold of δ 6 0.
We show how each G7 country does in fact display three regimes — a surplus regime
and a deficit regime in which the current account tend to revert towards its long-run mean,
albeit at different speeds in each regime, and an ‘inertia regime’ in which, for intermedi-
ate levels of the current account balance between the surplus and deficit regimes, current
account adjustment is negligible. We can identify significant cross-country variation in the
size of the estimated thresholds as well as substantial cross-country variation in the es-
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timated speed of adjustment once countries cross their current account deficit or surplus
thresholds.
4.3.1 Disentangling the domestic components of current account
imbalances
In this section we plan to build on the analysis of chapter 3, summarised above, and de-
compose the speed of ca adjustment of the univariate model in its saving and investment
components, in order to identify the effect of changes in these variables on current account
imbalances. Specifically, we look at disaggregated data for savings, by analysing ca ad-
justment in terms of both Government and Private sector savings. We adopt the following
specification:
cat = α× 1{cat−d, δ}×sGt−1+α× 1{cat−d, δ} × sGt−1 +
+β×1{cat−d,δ} × sPt−1++β×1{cat−d,δ} × sPt−1 +
+γ×1{cat−d,δ} × it−1+γ×1{cat−d,δ} × it−1 +
+(1− 1{cat−d, δ})× (1−1{cat−d, δ})×cat−1+vt (4.23)
We look at quarterly data for the period 1979:1 to 2004:4. The data in the analy-
sis are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) Database by the IMF. All
variables are seasonally adjusted and expressed in national currency. According to the na-
tional account statistics, the current account variable is estimated as the sum of net exports
and net primary income from abroad (see above, [4.15]); net output is obtained by subtract-
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ing Government consumption expenditure and gross fixed capital formation (investment)
to GDP.
In line with the univariate results of chapter 3, the two asymmetric thresholds in the
TAR model are selected jointly by minimisation of the overall sum of squared errors. The
estimation method involves a double grid search over ca. Following Hansen (1997), the
range for the grid search is selected a priori to contain ca observations in between the 15th
(ca) and the 85th percentile (ca). This reduction in the grid range is needed in order to
avoid sorting too few observations in one regime for extreme values of the thresholds. As
a result, the appropriate ranges are defined as R = [μ, ca] and R = [μ, ca], for δ and δ
respectively. We select a delay equal to 2.
As the minimisation process for a three-regime/ two-threshold TAR process is nu-
merically intensive, we rely on the estimation methodology proposed by Hansen (1999) for
multiple thresholds. This consists of a three-stage grid search, where the second-stage es-
timation of the two-threshold model is made conditional on the first-stage single-threshold
estimate of δ (either δ or δ), the third stage being used as a refinement.
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Q1 1979- Q4 2004
COUNTRY Upper threshold Lower threshold
1(ca{2}>T1)*sG{1} 0.660 (0.090)
2.95 -4.32 1(ca{2}<T2)*sG{1} 0.713 (0.179)
1(ca{2}>T1)*sP{1} 0.937 (0.061)
1(ca{2}<T2)*sP{1} 0.944 (0.064)
1(ca{2}>T1)*i{1} -0.589 (0.146)
1(ca{2}<T2)*i{1} -0.924 (0.148)
1(T1>ca{2}>T2)*ca{1} 1.000
1(ca{2}>T1)*sG{1} 0.782 (0.097)
3.67 -3.11 1(ca{2}<T2)*sG{1} 0.771 (0.122)
1(ca{2}>T1)*sP{1} 0.933 (0.130)
1(ca{2}<T2)*sP{1} 0.618 (0.203)
1(ca{2}>T1)*i{1} -1.097 (0.085)
1(ca{2}<T2)*i{1} -1.035 (0.073)
1(T1>ca{2}>T2)*ca{1} 1.000
1(ca{2}>T1)*sG{1} 0.755 (0.084)
0.42 -0.45 1(ca{2}<T2)*sG{1} 0.784 (0.081)
1(ca{2}>T1)*sP{1} 0.958 (0.172)
1(ca{2}<T2)*sP{1} 0.452 (0.213)
1(ca{2}>T1)*i{1} -0.944 (0.084)
1(ca{2}<T2)*i{1} -0.936 (0.088)
1(T1>ca{2}>T2)*ca{1} 1.000
1(ca{2}>T1)*sG{1} 0.702 (0.102)
0.00 -0.19 1(ca{2}<T2)*sG{1} 0.529 (0.118)
1(ca{2}>T1)*sP{1} 0.655 (0.110)
1(ca{2}<T2)*sP{1} 0.550 (0.112)
1(ca{2}>T1)*i{1} -0.916 (0.071)
1(ca{2}<T2)*i{1} -0.728 (0.089)
1(T1>ca{2}>T2)*ca{1} 1.000
1(ca{2}>T1)*sG{1} 1.071 (0.178)
1.63 -1.08 1(ca{2}<T2)*sG{1} 0.776 (0.150)
1(ca{2}>T1)*sP{1} 0.915 (0.082)
1(ca{2}<T2)*sP{1} 0.957 (0.073)
1(ca{2}>T1)*i{1} -0.979 (0.068)
1(ca{2}<T2)*i{1} -0.855 (0.061)
1(T1>ca{2}>T2)*ca{1} 1.000
1(ca{2}>T1)*sG{1} 0.264 (0.115)
0.03 -0.29 1(ca{2}<T2)*sG{1} 0.601 (0.164)
1(ca{2}>T1)*sP{1} 0.506 (0.104)
1(ca{2}<T2)*sP{1} 0.712 (0.136)
1(ca{2}>T1)*i{1} -0.725 (0.192)
1(ca{2}<T2)*i{1} -0.851 (0.097)
1(T1>ca{2}>T2)*ca{1} 1.000
1(ca{2}>T1)*sG{1} 0.852 (0.078)
0.46 -1.58 1(ca{2}<T2)*sG{1} 1.056 (0.172)
1(ca{2}>T1)*sP{1} 0.787 (0.067)
1(ca{2}<T2)*sP{1} 0.880 (0.196)
1(ca{2}>T1)*i{1} -0.755 (0.090)
1(ca{2}<T2)*i{1} -0.605 (0.242)
1(T1>ca{2}>T2)*ca{1} 1.000
Specification:
Threshold models of de-meaned CA/NO wrt Government S/NO, Private S/NO and I/NO 
Thresholds of CA/NO Model estimation
ca
CANADA
FRANCE
GERMANY
ITALY
ca = a1*1(ca{2}>T1)*sG{1} + a2*1(ca{2}<T2)*sG{1} + b1*1(ca{2}>T1)*sP{1} + b2*1(ca{2}<T2)*sP{1} + 
c1*1(ca{2}>T1)*i{1} + c2*1(ca{2}<T2)*i{1} + 1(T1>ca{2}>T2)*(sG+sP-i){1} + e
JAPAN 
UK
US
SE in brackets
Table 4.4: Threshold model of CA/NO and its domestic components
Results are reported in Table 4.4. Variables enter with the correct sign suggested
by the national accounting relationship, that is with a negative effect of lagged investment
on ca and positive of private and public savings. We find cross-country variation in the
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threshold values, which range for surplus regimes from the 3.67% of ca of France to the
immediate correction of Italy and for deficit regimes from the -4.32% level of Canada to
again a low threshold value of -0.19% for Italy. As regards the effect of the savings and
investment components on ca, deficit persistent countries, that is Canada, the UK and the
US, present very significantly higher slope parameters in the deficit regime, especially in
the case of lagged savings. The opposite can be said for surplus countries.
In terms of public and private savings, for the UK and Canada the private component
seems to have affected the slow ca adjustment from its deficit regime. On the contrary, in
the US, government savings have a predominant role in the sluggishness of the ca variable,
supporting the idea of a twin deficits where the poor fiscal stance feeds into the current
account.
4.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we look at the national income identity as a way to decomposing the current
account into its domestic components. We analyse trends in savings (both public and pri-
vate) and investment in G7 countries over the last two decades and find evidence that most
deficit countries have experienced declining private savings in the last years and negative
levels of public savings, especially in the case of Italy, the UK and the US.
A simple analysis of the main assumptions behind the national income identity and
the resulting current account definitions shows significant savings retention coefficients,
that is the existence, despite integrated capital markets, of a correlation between domestic
savings and investment, with a crowding out effect of government deficits on investment.
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Consistently with these results, we also find evidence of a correlation lower than minus
one between public and private savings, against the Ricardian hypothesis that government
spending should have no long run effect on the overall savings of the economy and thus on
the current account.
Given these preliminary insights, we investigate the role of savings and investment
in current account adjustment by extending the threshold methodology of chapter 3 to a
more disaggregated framework. Our estimates present the expected signs, as suggested
by the national accounting relationship, with a negative effect of lagged investment on ca
and positive of private and public savings. In line with our previous results, we find cross-
country variation in the threshold values. Deficit countries present significantly persistent
slope coefficient in the deficit regime, especially in the case of lagged savings. For the UK
and Canada, sluggishness in ca adjustment from its deficit regime seems mainly due to the
private savings component. For the US, the slow speed of adjustment of the government
savings component supports the hypothesis of a twin deficits (both public and external) fed
by a deterioration of the fiscal stance.
While the analysis of this chapter tries to shed some light on the domestic factors af-
fecting ca adjustment in G7 countries, its conclusions are not exhaustive. A comprehensive
explanation of the current global imbalances would require an analysis of global devel-
opments in savings patterns across the world, with a special emphasis to the increase in
global savings led by emerging markets (what Chairman Bernanke defines as the "savings
glut" ) and to productivity levels, rates of return and asset prices in the US and other deficit
countries.
Chapter 5
Thresholds of Real Exchange Rate and
Current Account Adjustment
5.1 Introduction
While the theoretical literature has been widely focusing on the role of relative prices, that is
of real exchange rates, in current account adjustment28, there are only few empirical works
trying to produce estimates of this relationship. The recent empirical contribution by Chinn
and Lee (2005) has tried to fill this gap by looking at a VAR model of the exchange rate and
current account. Furthermore, the strict link between exchange rate and ca adjustment has
been further corroborated by recent empirical research on the role of the valuation channel
in current account adjustments, in particular in the part accounted for by changes in the
exchange rate (see Gourinchas and Rey (2005), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), Freund
and Warnock (2005)).
Time series analysis of the real exchange rate and current account has identified in
the last years evidence of nonlinear behaviour in both these variables. To date, however,
there is no comprehensive explanation of their joint dynamics, in particular on the role of
the real exchange rate in determining the nonlinear adjustment of the current account.
Since the seminal work by Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) and Taylor et al. (2001) the
literature on the real exchange rate has provided evidence of strong nonlinearities in its
28 See for example the latest works by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2004).
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dynamics, showing that real exchange rates are stationary but exhibit nonlinear adjustment
to their unconditional mean. In chapter 3, we reported statistically significant evidence
in favour of differing adjustment dynamics in the current-account-to-net-output ratio for
the G7 countries. These results supported the point, shared by several observers29, that in
the current global economic environment there is a “threshold” current account imbalance
beyond which adjustment must ultimately take place, even if evidence of adjustment is
scarce or non-existent before the threshold is reached.
Furthermore, we partially addressed the interlinkages between real exchange rate and
current account adjustment, by means of a simple GARCH analysis and found evidence of
statistically significant shifts in the mean and variance of the probability distribution of sev-
eral G7 exchange rates, equity prices, and interest rate differentials that occurred in con-
junction with the estimated current account adjustment regimes. In particular, we found
a tendency towards exchange rate depreciation during current account deficit regimes and
exchange rate appreciation during current account surplus regimes, and statistically signifi-
cant increases in exchange rate volatility during current account deficit adjustment regimes
for the US, Japan, and Germany. This suggested scope for further research in the joint mod-
eling of exchange rates and the current account within a nonlinear framework, which is the
purpose of this chapter. Extending the empirical TAR methodology to a bivariate context
for all the G7 countries, we find evidence of a strict link between current account adjust-
ments and deviations of a country real exchange rate from its long run equilibrium, such
29 See Bergsten (2002), Holman (2001), Greenspan (2003).
5.2 Estimating and testing threshold models of the exchange rate 104
that beyond a certain appreciation/depreciation level of the real exchange rate, a country
CA imbalance would start reverting towards its mean value.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section II estimates and tests a threshold model
of the exchange rate in G7 countries, confirming previous results in the literature. Sec-
tion III conducts a similar exercise for the current account, along the lines of the analysis
in chapter 3. Section IV estimates first an univariate CA model with thresholds of reer
and then moves to the estimation of a bivariate threshold model for the analysis of the
current account and real exchange rate dynamics. Section VI identifies the speeds of cur-
rent account adjustment in G7 countries, by means of nonlinear impulse response analysis.
Section VII concludes.
5.2 Estimating and testing threshold models of the exchange
rate
In the literature on the exchange rate and its predictability, there is strong empirical ev-
idence of threshold effects in real exchange rate adjustment (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997;
Taylor, Peel and Sarno, 2001; Kilian and Taylor, 2003; Imbs et al., 2003; Taylor and Tay-
lor, 2004). In particular, these authors show that real exchange rates are stationary but
exhibit nonlinear adjustment to their unconditional mean.
Building on these contributions, we estimate and test for each G7 country a thresh-
old autoregressive model of the real effective exchange rate (REER) using the univari-
ate approach developed in Hansen (1996)30. We allow for and estimate country-specific
30 We initially test for non-linearity in G7 current account/net output adjustment following the non-parametric
test for nonlinearity developed by Luukkonen et al. (1988) and Terasvirta (1994). Evidence of nonlinear ad-
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means, country and regime-specific thresholds, and country and regime specific dynamic
adjustment once the exchange has crossed either of the thresholds. Letting q = 100 ∗
(log(REER)− μ) , we write the equilibrium threshold autoregressive (TAR) model as
qt = ρ×1{qt−d,δ} × qt−1+ρ×1{qt−d,δ} × qt−1 + (5.24)
+(1− 1{qt−d,δ})× (1− 1{qt−d,δ})× qt−1+et
where 1{qt−d, δ} is an indicator function that takes on a value of 1 when qt−d > δ > 0
(and zero otherwise) and 1{qt−d, δ} is an indicator function that takes on a value of 1 when
qt−d < δ 6 0 (and zero otherwise). This approach postulates that the persistence of an
exchange rate appreciation (depreciation) in a country may depend upon whether or not the
exchange rate has crossed an upper threshold of δ > 0 or a lower threshold of δ 6 0. We
note that a special case of the threshold model is the case in which δ = δ = 0 and ρ = ρ
< 1 in which case it collapses to a linear stationary AR(1) process. We experimented with a
threshold TAR(2) specification but found in general the second lag terms to be insignificant,
and thus confine our presentation to the TAR(1) models. We also select a delay parameter
d of two quarters as this maximises the fit of the regression in each case.
The threshold model can potentially identify three regimes of real exchange rate ad-
justment: an upper adjustment regime, a lower adjustment regime, and an ‘inertia’ regime
δ < qt−2 < δ in which the real exchange rate appears to follow a random walk. In a more
general smooth threshold transition autoregressive or STAR model (e.g. Taylor, Peel and
Sarno, 2001), the speed of adjustment does not increase discontinuously at the threshold;
justment is indicated at the 5% significance level for all countries.
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rather, the further way is the exchange rate from its long-run mean, the faster it adjusts. Al-
though STAR models proved useful tools in order to identify the nonlinear behaviour of the
exchange rate, we prefer to adopt a simple TAR model, given evidence on the discrete na-
ture of the current account adjustment and our interest in investigating exchange rate and
current account adjustment in a multivariate framework.
Before presenting the results, we will discuss some issues involved in the estimation
and testing of these model for a system comprised of the G7 countries. The q variables
for the G7 group are first demeaned. A non-zero mean proves to be applicable for all
G7 countries. In particular, we detect a structural break in the German series in 1991,
corresponding with the German unification; we account for the break by allowing two
different means in the real exchange rate for the pre- and post-unification periods.
The two asymmetric thresholds in the TAR model are selected jointly by minimisa-
tion of the overall sum of squared errors. The estimation method involves a double grid
search over q. Following Hansen (1997), the range for the grid search is selected a priori
to contain q observations in between the 15th (q) and the 85th percentile (q). This re-
duction in the grid range is needed in order to avoid sorting too few observations in one
regime for extreme values of the thresholds. As a result, the appropriate ranges are defined
asR = [μ,q] andR = [μ,q], for δ and δ respectively.
As the minimisation process for a three-regime/ two-threshold TAR process is nu-
merically intensive, we rely on the estimation methodology proposed by Hansen (1999) for
multiple thresholds. This consists of a three-stage grid search, where the second-stage es-
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timation of the two-threshold model is made conditional on the first-stage single-threshold
estimate of δ (either δ or δ), the third stage being used as a refinement.
Furthermore, final estimates of slope parameters and standard errors for the G7 group
of countries are obtained by seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimation, in order to
allow for potential correlation between the disturbances of the different q equations, due to
common unobservable factors.
Once the thresholds have been selected, according to standard asymptotic theory,
(1) is linear in the parameters. As with any simple dummy-variable regression, it can be
estimated by linear methods. However, statistical inference in a TAR model bears the
difficulty that the thresholds δ and δ may be not identified under the null hypothesis in
question (Davies, 1987). In this case, the usual χ2 distribution needs to be replaced by
an approximated empirical distribution obtained by bootstrapping the residuals (Hansen
1997). In particular, artificial observations are calibrated using the restricted estimates
and are then used to obtain new estimates of the restricted and unrestricted model (for an
application, see Peel and Taylor 2002). The percentage of bootstrap samples – we run
1000 replications – for which the simulated likelihood-ratio statistics exceeds the actual
one forms the bootstrap approximation to the p-value of the test statistic under question.
The estimation and testing results are presented in Table 5.1. First the test results:
when we test the null hypothesis a single threshold for all countries versus the alternative
hypothesis of two thresholds, we reject the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative. This
is consistent with three regimes for each country. Second, when we test the hypothesis that
the current account follows a random walk inside the ‘inertia’ regime against the alternative
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that it follows a mean reverting autoregressive process inside the inertia regime (a more
general formulation of the threshold model) we are unable to reject the null of a random
walk inside the inertia regime. In summary, the statistical tests find evidence of non-linear
reer adjustment and also identify significant thresholds beyond which this adjustment takes
place.
Q1 1979- Q4 2004
COUNTRY Upper threshold Lower threshold above band below REER
10.62 -12.26 0.939 1.000 0.941 473.31
(0.026) (0.030)
0.42 -4.54 0.887 1.000 0.911 467.97
(0.037) (0.039)
1.85 -4.30 0.853 1.000 0.918 473.76
(0.036) (0.036) 468.46
10.61 -6.22 0.927 1.000 0.877 466.83
(0.037) (0.045)
12.09 -0.36 0.906 1.000 0.913 438.15
(0.026) (0.018)
10.29 -9.13 0.874 1.000 0.866 448.16
(0.052) (0.041)
15.26 -10.37 0.960 1.000 0.920 453.32
(0.020) (0.025)
Bootstrap: LR-test for band coefficient equal to 1 (SUR): marg.signif. level = 0.994
LR-test for single threshold (SUR): marg. signif. level = 0.000
Threshold models of de-meaned log REER 
Thresholds of REER Slope coefficients Means
CANADA
FRANCE
GERMANY
(asymmetric band) (estimation by SUR)
SE in brackets
ITALY
JAPAN 
UK
US
Table 5.1: Threshold Models of REER
In the results reported in Table 5.1, we find evidence of threshold behaviour in the real
effective exchange rate, with wide thresholds and parameter variations across G7 countries.
The inertia band is delimited in between 10.62 and -12.26 for Canada, where is just in
between 0.42 and -4.54 for France. As regards the parameter estimates, Canada and US
present the slowest speed of adjustment, both above and below the thresholds.
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5.3 ”Are there thresholds of current account adjustment?”: an
update
In chapter 3, we reported evidence in favour of this proposition. By means of a TAR model
similar to that one described in the previous section for the real effective exchange rate,
we found statistically significant evidence of differing adjustment dynamics in the current-
account-to-net-output ratio for all of the G7 countries examined. In particular, each country
displayed three regimes — a surplus regime and a deficit regime in which the current ac-
count tended to revert towards its long-run mean, albeit at different speeds in each regime
(showing that sign does indeed matter), and an ‘inertia regime’ in which, for intermedi-
ate levels of the current account balance between the surplus and deficit regimes, current
account adjustment was negligible (showing that size also matters). We also showed, how-
ever, that one size does not fit all in the sense that we found significant cross-country
variation in the size of the estimated thresholds. We also found substantial cross-country
variation in the estimated speed of adjustment once countries cross their current account
deficit or surplus thresholds.
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Q1 1979- Q4 2004
COUNTRY Upper threshold Lower threshold above band below 'Surplus' 'Deficit'
1.20 -4.25 0.912 1.000 0.927 -1.587
(0.048) (0.060)
3.64 -1.11 0.964 1.000 0.888 0.244
(0.047) (0.043)
0.31 -0.31 0.857 1.000 0.862 6.185 Pre-1991
(0.075) (0.064) 3.536 Post-1991
3.43 0.00 0.895 1.000 0.771 0.008
(0.083) (0.071)
0.80 -0.31 0.924 1.000 0.918 4.072
(0.053) (0.035)
0.00 -0.29 0.433 1.000 0.840 -1.911
(0.101) (0.097)
2.37 -2.54 0.927 1.000 1.051 -2.237
(0.036) (0.031)
Bootstrap:
(asymmetric band) (estimation by SUR)
LR-test for band coefficient equal to 1 (SUR): marg.signif. level = 0.544
LR-test for single threshold (SUR): marg. signif. level = 0.003
Threshold models of de-meaned CA/NO
Thresholds Slope coefficients Means
CANADA
FRANCE
GERMANY
SE in brackets
ITALY
JAPAN 
UK
US
Table 5.2: Threshold Models of CA/NO: 1979 - 2004
In Table 5.2 we replicate those results extending the sample period to end- 200431.
Results are comparable to the previous one, even if we do notice differences in the band
width and in the adjustment coefficients. For example, the addition of more recent obser-
vation narrows the inertia band for Germany, which present a less persistent surplus regime
and an upper threshold closer to its long run surplus mean and symmetric with respect to
the lower threshold. Once again, results on the US are a case of their own, with a deficit ad-
justment coefficient of 1.051 (whereas the sample ending in 2003 estimated it at 0.973) and
31 Tests for non-linearity - following the Terasvirta(1994) methodology - on the updated current account
series show evidence of nonlinear adjustment at 5% significance level for France, Germany, Japan and the
US, and at 10% for the UK.
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a lower threshold of -2.54. This result reflects the delayed adjustment of .the US current
account in recent years, which is at odds with evidence from previous periods.
Nevertheless, while an univariate analysis of current account adjustment in G7 coun-
tries can provide useful insights on the differing dynamics and adjustment magnitudes af-
fecting each country, it only represents a first step in the analysis as it fails to provide an
explanation behind these specific patterns.
In the previous chapter, we partially addressed this issue, by means of a simple
GARCH analysis and found evidence of statistically significant shifts in the mean and vari-
ance of the probability distribution of several G7 exchange rates, equity prices, and interest
rate differentials that occur in conjunction with our estimated current account adjustment
regimes. In particular, we found a tendency towards exchange rate depreciation during cur-
rent account deficit regimes and exchange rate appreciation during current account surplus
regimes, and statistically significant increases in exchange rate volatility during current ac-
count deficit adjustment regimes for the US, Japan, and Germany. This suggested scope
for further research in the joint modeling of exchange rates and the current account within
a nonlinear framework.
5.4 What is determining the CA adjustment? The role of the
real exchange rate
In the previous sections, we confirmed evidence in the literature that both the real exchange
rate and the current account in G7 countries are stationary but exhibit nonlinear adjustment
to their unconditional mean. In this section of the chapter, we plan to explore the empirical
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relationship between thresholds of real exchange rate adjustment and thresholds of current
account adjustment. In fact, in line with our previous results, we would expect to find a
strict link between current account adjustments and deviations of a country real exchange
rate from its long run equilibrium, such that beyond a certain appreciation/depreciation
of the real exchange rate, a country CA imbalance would start reverting towards its mean
value.
Our approach is consistent with the recent theoretical contributions by Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2004) and the empirical VAR approach adopted by Chinn and Lee (2005) in em-
phasizing the jointly determination of exchange rate adjustments and reductions on tradable
goods consumption. Furthermore, evidence on the link between exchange rate and ca ad-
justment seems to corroborate recent empirical evidence on the role of the valuation chan-
nel in current account adjustments, in particular in the part accounted for by changes in the
exchange rate (see Gourinchas and Rey (2005), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), Freund
and Warnock (2005)). However, differently from those valuable cross-sectional investiga-
tions, the trade and valuation channels cannot be disentangled in our analysis due to limited
data availability on net foreign assets for time series analysis32.
Letting ca = 100∗CA/NO, we estimate a new equilibrium threshold autoregressive
model for the ca variable as
32 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti(2005) provides an extensive database on net foreign assets at annual frequency.
The use of linearly interpolated quarterly data does not represent a feasible solution as it would bias the
nonlinear nature of the data.
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cat = ρ×1{qt−d,δ} × cat−1+ρ×1{qt−d,δ} × cat−1 + (5.25)
+(1− 1{qt−d,δ})× (1− 1{qt−d,δ})× cat−1+et
This approach postulates that the persistence of a current account surplus (deficit) in
a country may depend upon whether or not the real exchange rate has crossed an upper
threshold of δ > 0 or a lower threshold of δ 6 0, i.e. on the magnitude of its appreciation
(depreciation). Because the exchange rate is an asset price, and because of the well doc-
umented lags between real exchange rate and current account adjustment, we allow for a
delay of 2 quarters in the current account equation.
Estimates for country-specific means, country and regime-specific thresholds, and
country and regime specific autoregressive dynamics are reported in Table 5.333. We find
strong evidence on the existence of thresholds of reer in ca adjustments in the G7 coun-
try sample. We notice once again wide cross-country variation in the estimated adjustment
thresholds. For example, the estimated current account deficit adjustment for the US takes
place for deviations of the real exchange rate from its long run mean of -11%, and for Japan
for over -27%, while for France for just a -0.6% correction. We estimate a similar varia-
tion also for surplus adjustments, whereas the UK presents one of the highest reer thresh-
olds among G7 countries with a deviation from equilibrium of 8% before CA adjustment,
while Germany presents an immediate adjustment towards its mean. We also see substan-
tial cross-country variation in the estimated autoregressive dynamics once countries cross
33 Note that CA/NO means differ from those ones in Table 4.2 due to the different data availability for the
reer variable (from 1995:1).
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their exchange rate thresholds. For deficit adjustment episodes, the estimated autoregres-
sive coefficients range from 0.621 for the UK to 0.941 for the US. For surplus adjustment
episodes, the estimated autoregressive coefficients range from 0.945 in the US to 0.417 in
the UK. Note, in particular, the case of France where the surplus coefficient does not seem
to adjust to a reer appreciation.
CA/NO               
Q1 1979- Q4 2004
COUNTRY Upper threshold Lower threshold above band below CA/NO REER
1.73 -13.19 0.915 1.000 0.832 -1.519 473.31
(0.051) (0.076)
3.70 -0.58 1.148 1.000 0.853 0.244 467.97
(0.063) (0.041)
Pre-/Post 1991
0.00 -5.65 0.869 1.000 0.624 6.576 473.76
(0.071) (0.139) 3.536 468.46
1.68 --5.92 0.700 1.000 0.853 -0.080 466.83
(0.115) (0.073)
4.48 -27.06 0.773 1.000 0.771 4.289 438.15
(0.073) (0.044)
8.04 -2.82 0.417 1.000 0.621 -1.965 448.16
(0.146) (0.104)
 3.64 -10.98 0.945 1.000 0.941 -2.350 453.32
(0.032) (0.059)
(estimation by SUR)(asymmetric band)
SE in brackets
ITALY
JAPAN 
UK
US
Threshold models of de-meaned CA/NO
Thresholds of REER Slope coefficients Means
CANADA
FRANCE
GERMANY
Table 5.3: CA/NO Models with Thresholds of REER
Given the encouraging results of the univariate CA model with thresholds of reer, we
proceed with the estimation of a threshold model for the analysis of the current account and
real exchange rate dynamics, by treating both variables endogenously as in the following
bivariate system:
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cat = α×1{qt−d,δ} × cat−1+α×1{qt−d,δ} × cat−1 +
+α×(1− 1{qt−d,δ})× (1− 1{qt−d,δ})× cat−1 +
+β×1{qt−d,δ} × qt−1 + β×1{qt−d,δ} × qt−1 +
+β×(1− 1{qt−d,δ})× (1− 1{qt−d,δ})× qt−1+et (5.26)
qt = γ×1{qt−d,δ} × cat−1+γ×1{qt−d,δ} × cat−1 +
+γ×(1− 1{qt−d,δ})× (1− 1{qt−d,δ})× cat−1 +
+δ×1{qt−d,δ} × qt−1 + δ×1{qt−d,δ} × qt−1 +
+δ×(1− 1{qt−d,δ})× (1− 1{qt−d,δ})× qt−1+ut (5.27)
We think of this as potentially an useful nonlinear model for evaluating the hypoth-
esis that threshold breaks in the real exchange rate have incremental predictive content for
subsequent current account dynamics. Especially in a world of transport cost and trade fric-
tions (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2001) we should expect such threshold effects in real exchange
rates to be potentially important in influencing trade flows. Given the nonlinear nature of
the specification, we estimate the system as a set of simultaneous equations and conduct a
three-stage grid search to identify the upper and lower reer threshold for each country.
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Q1 1979- Q4 2004
COUNTRY Upper threshold Lower threshold above band below above band below CA/NO REER
CA/NO{1} 0.960*** 0.927*** 0.604*** 0.110 0.251** -0.182
10.67 -12.43 (0.071) (0.051) (0.102) (0.114) (0.082) (0.163) -1.519 473.31
reer{1} -0.020 -0.012 -0.123*** 0.943*** 1.136*** 0.870***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.033) (0.030) (0.035) (0.052)
 
CA/NO{1} 1.202*** 0.949*** 0.940*** 0.129 0.012 -0.123
3.70 -1.28 (0.071) (0.041) (0.048) (0.108) (0.062) (0.073) 0.244 467.97
reer{1} 0.044 0.014 -0.020 0.863*** 0.992*** 0.907***
(0.039) (0.054) (0.034) (0.059) (0.082) (0.051)
 
CA/NO{1} 0.875*** 0.846*** 0.814*** 0.266*** -0.003 0.296**
2.56 -2.02 (0.091) (0.070) (0.118) (0.090) (0.069) (0.116) 6.576 473.76
reer{1} -0.026 -0.206** -0.017 0.903*** 0.910*** 0.866*** 3.536 468.46
(0.050) (0.087) (0.053) (0.049) (0.086) (0.052)
 
CA/NO{1} -0.569* 0.872*** 0.888*** 1.583** 0.026 0.029
8.02 -6.25 (0.343) (0.063) (0.075) (0.526) (0.097) (0.115) -0.080 466.83
reer{1} -0.300*** 0.005 -0.039 1.240*** 1.081*** 0.892***
(0.070) (0.037) (0.032) (0.108) (0.057) (0.049)
 
CA/NO{1} 0.804*** 0.996*** 0.862*** 1.518** 1.599** 0.367
4.49 -13.28 (0.076) (0.081) (0.048) (0.538) (0.567) (0.342) 4.289 438.15
reer{1} -0.004 0.019 -0.007 0.932*** 0.562*** 0.934***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.036) (0.124) (0.036)
 
CA/NO{1} 0.375** 0.728*** 0.371* -0.344* -0.011 0.201
8.05 -9.13 (0.149) (0.089) (0.208) (0.207) (0.124) (0.290) -1.965 448.16
reer{1} 0.013 0.160** -0.030 0.963*** 1.112*** 0.885***
(0.042) (0.053) (0.035) (0.058) (0.073) (0.049)
 
CA/NO{1} 0.919*** 1.202*** 0.920*** 0.531* 0.249 0.294
3.48 -0.04 (0.029) (0.048) (0.038) (0.193) (0.319) (0.254) -2.350 453.32
reer{1} -0.018*** -0.040 -0.014** 0.997*** 1.263*** 0.988***
(0.005) (0.031) (0.007) (0.033) (0.206) (0.048)
(asymmetric band)
ITALY
JAPAN 
UK
R^2: 0.925 R^2: 0.889
Pre-/Post 1991
US
Thresholds of REER Means
CANADA
FRANCE
GERMANY
CA/NO reer
Slope coefficients 
Threshold system of de-meaned CA/NO and reer
R^2: 0.966
SE in brackets SE in brackets
R^2: 0.890
R^2: 0.927
R^2: 0.951
R^2: 0.895
R^2: 0.797
R^2: 0.752
R^2: 0.891
R^2: 0.968 R^2: 0.943
R^2: 0.513
R^2: 0.906
Table 5.4: Threshold System of CA/NO and REER
Results are reported in Table 5.4. The country dynamics and thresholds slightly differ
for some country from the univariate estimates. In general, the fit of the model is good and
provides close predicted values (Figure 5.1 shows fitted versus actual values for the two
variables for all G7 countries).
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JAPAN: CA/NO
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Figure 5.1: Threshold System of CA/NO and REER - Fitted versus Actual Values
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5.5 Speed of CA and reer adjustment: nonlinear impulse
responses
In order to better evaluate the speed of mean reversion exhibited by ca and q, we look at im-
pulse responses, following the methodology introduced by Koop et al.(1996) and applied in
Taylor et al.(2001). The difficulty in producing multi-step forecasts for a nonlinear process,
given the impact of future disturbances on the nonlinear function, is solved by Monte Carlo
integration. Impulse responses of ca and q to shocks of the variables of ±5%, ±10% and
±20% are plotted for each country in Figures 5.2-8. The fact that the different impulse
responses - with the exception of France, due to its persistent surplus slope coefficient34 -
converge to a single flat line profile is an indication that the processes are integrated short
memory in mean, i.e. that the long-horizon prediction of the processes is a vector of con-
stants - in this case, zeros as variables are demeaned. Figures 5.2-8 show different speed
of adjustment across countries: the impulse responses of Germany and Japan converge to
zero after around 40 quarters, while Canada and US only after over 70 quarters.
34 French estimates suggest lack of mean-reversion during surplus periods. This specific pattern seems to
arise from the ca-reer interaction: the French ca surplus kept increasing although its reer was appreciating in
1998 and then steadily declined despite the significant real depreciation in the 1999-2001 period. Therefore,
the high surplus coefficient and the resulting explosive path are likely to reflect the lack of correction in the
French ca -at least during surplus periods - following movements in the reer. Nevertheless, the ca behaviour
remains sustainable once we simply look at the baseline model with thresholds of ca.
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CANADA: Impulse responses of CA/NO
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Figure 5.2: Nonlinear Impulse Responses - Canada
FRANCE: Impulse responses of CA/NO
CA/NO shocks of +/- 20%, 10%, 5%
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Figure 5.3: Nonlinear Impulse Responses - France
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GERMANY: Impulse responses of CA/NO
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Figure 5.4: Nonlinear Impulse Responses - Germany
ITALY: Impulse responses of CA/NO
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Figure 5.5: Nonlinear Impulse Responses - Italy
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JAPAN: Impulse responses of CA/NO
CA/NO shocks of +/- 20%, 10%, 5%
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
1 12 23 34 45 56 67 78 89 100 111 122 133 144 155 166 177 188 199
JAPAN: Impulse responses of reer
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Figure 5.6: Nonlinear Impulse Responses - Japan
UK: Impulse responses of CA/NO
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UK: Impulse responses of reer
CA/NO shocks of +/- 20%, 10%, 5%
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Figure 5.7: Nonlinear Impulse Responses - UK
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US: Impulse responses of CA/NO
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Figure 5.8: Nonlinear Impulse Responses - US
5.6 Concluding remarks
Are there thresholds of current account adjustment and are these identified by changes in
the adjustment of the real exchange rate? This chapter has reported evidence in favour of
both these propositions. We found statistically significant evidence of differing adjustment
dynamics in the current-account-to-net-output ratio and real exchange rate for all of the G7
countries examined. In particular, each country displayed three regimes — a surplus regime
and a deficit regime in which the current account tended to revert towards its long-run
mean, albeit at different speeds in each regime (depending on the size of real exchange rate
adjustment), and an ‘inertia regime’ in which, for intermediate levels of the real exchange
rate misalignment, current account adjustment was negligible. We also showed significant
cross-country variation in the size of the estimated thresholds and in the estimated speeds
of adjustment once countries cross their relevant thresholds.
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5.A Appendix: Data and variable definitions
We look at quarterly data for the period 1979:1 to 2004:4. We choose our starting date to
begin six years after the advent of floating exchange rates and the initial globalization of the
international capital market that occurred at that time and in conjunction with the first oil
shock. The data in the analysis are obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
Database by the IMF. All variables are seasonally adjusted and expressed in national cur-
rency. According to national account statistics, the current account variable is estimated as
the sum of net exports and net primary income from abroad (NPIA); net output is obtained
by subtracting Government consumption expenditure and gross fixed capital formation (in-
vestment) to GDP. For the exchange rate variables, we refer to trade weighted real effective
exchange rate indices, whereas a decrease in the index corresponds to a depreciation (data
are available as from 1980:1).
Chapter 6
A TAR test of the present-value model of the
current account
6.1 Introduction
The intertemporal approach to the current account provides an intuitive explanation to the
existence of temporary current account deficits and surpluses, by focusing on the optimal
saving decisions of a representative household as it smooths consumption over time. In its
simplest form, the model implies that a country current account position is determined by
the present value of expected future changes in net output, such that a country experiencing
a temporary fall in output would be expected to run a current account deficit and viceversa.
Intertemporal models of the current account have been estimated and tested many
times, and their high frequency implications – that current account dynamics are fully
described by the discounted sum of future changes in net output – are usually rejected.
Most of these empirical works have extended the seminal work by Campbell (1987) and
Campbell-Shiller (1987) on consumption theory, by comparing VAR forecasts of the present
value of changes in net output to the actual current account series. Results proved un-
satisfactory, especially for small open economies. Nevertheless, contributions by Bergin-
Sheffrin(2000) and recently by Nason-Rogers (2006) have highlighted the relevant explana-
tory power of the interest rate and real exchange rate in the present value model of the cur-
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rent account. Although the restrictions of the model are still rejected for some countries,
the inclusion of such valuation effects significantly improves the model predictions.
In this chapter, we build on the results of chapter 5 in order to estimate a present
value test of the current account within a nonlinear framework. Evidence on the threshold
behaviour of the current account and on the significant effect of the real exchange rate on
its adjustment encourage this type of analysis. The next section of the chapter sketches the
main features of the theoretical model used to develop our econometric framework. Section
3 describes the empirical methodology and presents the estimation results for the nonlin-
ear system as well as the parameter values for the present value test. Section 4 analyses
the temporary components of the relevant variables in order to identify their convergence
patterns towards steady state and therefore enable a finite time analysis of the model. The
predictive power of the model is finally analysed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the
chapter.
6.2 The present value model of the CA: theoretical framework
The workhorse intertemporal model of the current account (Sachs, 1981; Sheffrin and Woo,
1990, via Campbell, 1987) has the following strong empirical implication:
CAt = −Et
∞X
i=1
(1 + r)−i∆NOt+i (6.28)
Thus, according to the intertemporal model, the current account balance is the dis-
counted present value of future expected changes in net output. Papers that implement tests
of this equation have traditionally assumed that the level of NOt is I(1) so that the first
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difference of NOt, ∆NOt is I(0). This assumption has a very important implication: that
the level of the current account is stationary. This equation has been tested many times in a
linear vector autoregression framework and is almost always rejected.
For a variety of reasons, it would seem to be preferable to model ∆ lnNOt = ∆not
as stationary. Following Campbell and Shiller (1987), Kano (2003) proposes the following
present value representation of the current account-net output ratio:
CAt
NOt
= brt + [(σ − 1)c+ 1]
∞X
i=1
kiEtrt+i −
∞X
i=1
kiEt∆ lnNOt+i (6.29)
k = eγ−μ
where c, b, γ, μ, σ are respectively the unconditional mean of the current account-
net output ratio, CAtNOt ; the unconditional mean of the net foreign asset-net output ratio,
Bt
NOt−1
; the unconditional mean of the first difference of the log of net output, ∆ lnNOt;
the unconditional mean of the gross world real interest rate, ln(1 + rt) ≈ rt; the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution. All the variables are represented as deviations from their
unconditional mean. Note that if the log difference of net output is stationary, it is the
current account to net output ratio which is stationary, not simply the current account itself.
In particular, the statistically significant effect of the real exchange rate on the dy-
namic equation for the current-account-to-net-output-ratio suggests the relevance of the
introduction of this variable in the intertemporal model. Along this line, Bergin-Sheffrin
(2000) consider a small country producing traded and nontraded goods and introduce a
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consumption-based real interest rate r∗, which reflects both the interest rate r and the
change in the relative price of nontraded goods, reer.
r∗t = rt + [
1− σ
σ
(1− a)]∆qt (6.30)
where
U(CTt, CNt) =
1
1− 1/σ (C
a
TtC
1−a
Nt )
1−1/σ (6.31)
∆qt = lnREERt − lnREERt−1 (6.32)
Equations (6.29) and (6.30) suggest the estimation of the following present-value
representation:
CAt
NOt
= br∗t + [(σ − 1)c+ 1]
∞X
i=1
kiEtr∗t+i −
∞X
i=1
kiEt∆ lnNOt+i (6.33)
or alternatively,
CAt
NOt
= brt + b[
1− σ
σ
(1− a)]∆reert +
+[(σ − 1)c+ 1]
∞X
i=1
kiEt[rt+i + [
1− σ
σ
(1− a)]∆reert+i] +
−
∞X
i=1
kiEt∆ lnNOt+i (6.34)
This new framework for testing the present value model of the current account allows
to account not just for expected changes in net output, but also for both intertemporal
and intratemporal changes in the exchange rate and the interest rate. Under this setting,
consumption decisions are affected by valuation effects arising from changes in the terms
6.3 Empirical methodology and parameter calibration 129
of borrowing and lending with the rest of the world as well as from changes in the relative
price of nontraded goods.
6.3 Empirical methodology and parameter calibration
In this section of the chapter, we plan to estimate a system of cat, qt,∆not and rt, whereas
cat and qt follow a nonlinear threshold process with thresholds of qt35. Note that the use
of a nonlinear framework for the analysis of the intertemporal approach to the current
account does not allow to test the standard restrictions of the PVM as in a linear VAR
model. Therefore, we need to compute a finite-time present-value model prediction for the
ca variable directly from our forecasts of the variables, obtained by bootstrap methods on
the system fitted residuals.
The standard VAR model used in the literature is replaced in our analysis by a group
of simultaneous equation with the following processes:
cat = α1 × 1{qt−d, δ} × cat−1 + α2 × 1{qt−d, δ} × cat−1 +
+α3 × (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× cat−1 +
+β1 × 1{qt−d, δ} × qt−1 + β2 × 1{qt−d, δ} × qt−1 +
+β
3
× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× qt−1+
+γ1 ×∆not−1 + δ1 × r∗t + u1t (6.35)
35 We reject the hypothesis of nonlinearities in the behaviour of both∆not and r∗t .
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qt = α4 × 1{qt−d, δ} × cat−1 + α5 × 1{qt−d, δ} × cat−1 +
+α6 × (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× cat−1 +
+β4 × 1{qt−d, δ} × qt−1 + β5 × 1{qt−d, δ} × qt−1 +
+β
6
× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× qt−1 +
+γ2 ×∆not−1 + δ2 × r∗t + u2t (6.36)
∆not = α7 × 1{qt−d, δ} × cat−1 + α8 × 1{qt−d, δ} × cat−1 +
+α9 × (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× cat−1 +
+β7 × 1{qt−d, δ} × qt−1 + β8 × 1{qt−d, δ} × qt−1 +
+β
9
× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× qt−1 +
+γ3 ×∆not−1 + δ3 × r∗t + u3t (6.37)
r∗t = α10 × 1{qt−d, δ} × cat−1 + α11 × 1{qt−d, δ} × cat−1 +
+α12 × (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× cat−1 +
+β10 × 1{qt−d, δ} × qt−1 + β11 × 1{qt−d, δ} × qt−1 +
+β
12
× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× (1− 1{qt−d, δ})× qt−1 +
+γ4 ×∆not−1 + δ4 × r∗t + u4t (6.38)
Estimates of the system are reported in Table 6.1-4 and fitted values for the relevant
variables are plotted in Figure 6.1-7. Data sources and definitions are described in the
Appendix. Results indicate a good fit for the ca, q and r∗. equations in all G7 countries.
However, the Dno equations present unsatisfactory R2. In general. the system does not
seem able to capture the volatility of changes in net output in line with actual data. This
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result represents a strong limitation to any test of a present-value model of the current
account, given the essential role of Dno forecasts for the ca predictions.
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} 0.092 0.091 0.092 0.091 0.092 0.091 -0.086 0.106 -0.086 0.106 -0.086 0.106
WRIR{1} -0.219 0.095 -0.219 0.095 -0.219 0.095 0.050 0.111 0.050 0.111 0.050 0.111
CA/NO{1} 0.235 0.060 -0.095 0.045 -0.160 0.087 0.955 0.069 0.940 0.053 0.603 0.101
reer{1} 0.064 0.020 -0.035 0.020 -0.018 0.029 -0.023 0.023 -0.021 0.024 -0.133 0.034
R^2 0.257 R^2 0.898
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} 0.093 0.175 0.093 0.175 0.093 0.175 0.050 0.053 0.050 0.053 0.050 0.053
WRIR{1} -0.073 0.183 -0.073 0.183 -0.073 0.183 0.735 0.055 0.735 0.055 0.735 0.055
CA/NO{1} 0.093 0.114 0.244 0.087 -0.197 0.167 0.069 0.035 -0.025 0.026 -0.093 0.051
reer{1} 0.954 0.038 1.136 0.039 0.864 0.056 0.036 0.011 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.017
R^2 0.966 R^2 0.853
10.44 -13.04
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} -0.715 0.068 -0.715 0.068 -0.715 0.068 -0.065 0.012 -0.065 0.012 -0.065 0.012
WRIR{1} 0.237 0.378 0.237 0.378 0.237 0.378 -0.187 0.069 -0.187 0.069 -0.187 0.069
CA/NO{1} 0.135 0.230 -0.254 0.418 0.106 0.277 0.983 0.042 1.022 0.076 0.760 0.050
reer{1} -0.115 0.181 0.612 0.417 -0.016 0.171 0.004 0.033 -0.048 0.076 -0.038 0.031
R^2 0.558 R^2 0.941
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} 0.016 0.021 0.016 0.021 0.016 0.021 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009 0.010 0.009
WRIR{1} -0.174 0.116 -0.174 0.116 -0.174 0.116 0.871 0.051 0.871 0.051 0.871 0.051
CA/NO{1} 0.014 0.071 -0.032 0.129 -0.180 0.085 -0.020 0.031 -0.028 0.057 -0.071 0.037
reer{1} 0.816 0.056 0.875 0.128 0.899 0.053 0.004 0.024 0.241 0.056 0.013 0.023
R^2 0.877 R^2 0.868
0.60 -0.20
CANADA
FRANCE
Upper threshold: Lower threshold:
above band below
bandabovebelowbandabove below
above band below
reer WRIR
Dno CA/NO
Upper threshold: Lower threshold:
below above band below
band below
above band
above band below above
Dno CA/NO
reer WRIR
Table 6.1: Threshold Model for Canada and France
6.3 Empirical methodology and parameter calibration 132
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} -0.114 0.095 -0.114 0.095 -0.114 0.095 -0.067 0.063 -0.067 0.063 -0.067 0.063
WRIR{1} 0.274 0.143 0.274 0.143 0.274 0.143 0.017 0.096 0.017 0.096 0.017 0.096
CA/NO{1} 0.089 0.136 0.741 0.204 -0.005 0.118 0.840 0.091 0.759 0.136 0.852 0.079
reer{1} -0.048 0.079 0.853 0.273 0.013 0.078 -0.003 0.052 -0.258 0.182 -0.053 0.052
R^2 0.168 R^2 0.728
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} -0.207 0.061 -0.207 0.061 -0.207 0.061 -0.021 0.025 -0.021 0.025 -0.021 0.025
WRIR{1} 0.031 0.093 0.031 0.093 0.031 0.093 0.913 0.037 0.913 0.037 0.913 0.037
CA/NO{1} 0.164 0.088 0.055 0.132 0.137 0.076 -0.098 0.035 -0.052 0.053 -0.011 0.031
reer{1} 0.894 0.051 0.629 0.177 0.904 0.051 -0.002 0.020 0.261 0.071 0.037 0.020
R^2 0.886 R^2 0.870
1.22 -0.01
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} -0.136 0.103 -0.136 0.103 -0.136 0.103 -0.019 0.130 -0.019 0.130 -0.019 0.130
WRIR{1} 0.129 0.068 0.129 0.068 0.129 0.068 -0.061 0.086 -0.061 0.086 -0.061 0.086
CA/NO{1} -0.097 0.253 0.006 0.099 0.026 0.043 -0.538 0.320 0.594 0.125 0.873 0.054
reer{1} -0.039 0.054 0.018 0.038 0.003 0.021 -0.304 0.068 -0.060 0.048 -0.028 0.026
R^2 0.056 R^2 0.815
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} -0.197 0.218 -0.197 0.218 -0.197 0.218 0.090 0.065 0.090 0.065 0.090 0.065
WRIR{1} 0.116 0.145 0.116 0.145 0.116 0.145 0.877 0.043 0.877 0.043 0.877 0.043
CA/NO{1} 1.609 0.538 -0.100 0.210 0.071 0.092 -0.030 0.159 -0.245 0.062 -0.045 0.027
reer{1} 1.251 0.115 1.070 0.080 0.945 0.044 -0.011 0.034 -0.030 0.024 -0.006 0.013
R^2 0.925 R^2 0.853
7.83 0.00
band below
Upper threshold: Lower threshold:
GERMANY
Dno CA/NO
above band below above band below
reer WRIR
above band below above band below
Upper threshold: Lower threshold:
ITALY
Dno CA/NO
above band below above band below
reer WRIR
above band below above
Table 6.2: Threshold model estimations for Germany and Italy
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Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} -0.275 0.100 -0.275 0.100 -0.275 0.100 -0.088 0.057 -0.088 0.057 -0.088 0.057
WRIR{1} 0.018 0.069 0.018 0.069 0.018 0.069 -0.138 0.039 -0.138 0.039 -0.138 0.039
CA/NO{1} 0.030 0.141 -0.030 0.126 0.044 0.094 0.879 0.081 0.755 0.072 1.052 0.054
reer{1} -0.011 0.008 -0.034 0.031 -0.014 0.010 -0.011 0.005 0.027 0.018 -0.022 0.005
R^2 0.115 R^2 0.901
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} 0.288 0.450 0.288 0.450 0.288 0.450 0.034 0.065 0.034 0.065 0.034 0.065
WRIR{1} -0.120 0.309 -0.120 0.309 -0.120 0.309 0.868 0.045 0.868 0.045 0.868 0.045
CA/NO{1} 1.873 0.636 1.208 0.566 0.910 0.422 0.152 0.092 -0.046 0.082 -0.075 0.061
reer{1} 0.943 0.038 0.654 0.139 0.914 0.043 -0.003 0.006 -0.058 0.020 -0.006 0.006
R^2 0.949 R^2 0.868
5.14 -9.28
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} -0.068 0.102 -0.068 0.102 -0.068 0.102 0.052 0.047 0.052 0.047 0.052 0.047
WRIR{1} 0.080 0.356 0.080 0.356 0.080 0.356 -0.076 0.163 -0.076 0.163 -0.076 0.163
CA/NO{1} -0.043 0.362 -0.316 0.302 0.052 0.233 0.402 0.165 0.858 0.138 0.634 0.106
reer{1} 0.025 0.118 0.048 0.127 -0.019 0.074 0.005 0.054 0.105 0.058 -0.002 0.034
R^2 0.020 R^2 0.486
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} -0.116 0.060 -0.116 0.060 -0.116 0.060 -0.009 0.013 -0.009 0.013 -0.009 0.013
WRIR{1} -0.378 0.211 -0.378 0.211 -0.378 0.211 0.864 0.044 0.864 0.044 0.864 0.044
CA/NO{1} -0.255 0.214 0.356 0.178 -0.169 0.137 0.089 0.045 0.117 0.037 -0.028 0.029
reer{1} 0.884 0.070 1.045 0.075 0.914 0.044 -0.030 0.015 0.005 0.016 0.001 0.009
R^2 0.905 R^2 0.849
10.05 -1.74
JAPAN
Dno CA/NO
above band below above band below
reer WRIR
above band below above band below
Upper threshold: Lower threshold:
UK
Dno CA/NO
above band below above band below
reer WRIR
above band below above band below
Upper threshold: Lower threshold:
Table 6.3: Threshold model estimations for Japan and UK
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Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} -0.158 0.102 -0.158 0.102 -0.158 0.102 -0.215 0.049 -0.215 0.049 -0.215 0.049
WRIR{1} -0.074 0.075 -0.074 0.075 -0.074 0.075 0.101 0.036 0.101 0.036 0.101 0.036
CA/NO{1} 0.380 0.123 -0.162 0.058 0.339 0.216 0.853 0.059 0.904 0.028 0.885 0.104
reer{1} 0.036 0.013 -0.036 0.016 0.041 0.025 -0.022 0.006 -0.029 0.008 -0.010 0.012
R^2 0.242 R^2 0.968
Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
Dno{1} -0.247 0.368 -0.247 0.368 -0.247 0.368 -0.097 0.078 -0.097 0.078 -0.097 0.078
WRIR{1} -0.344 0.271 -0.344 0.271 -0.344 0.271 0.743 0.057 0.743 0.057 0.743 0.057
CA/NO{1} 0.933 0.443 0.320 0.209 0.521 0.778 0.285 0.094 0.091 0.044 0.036 0.165
reer{1} 1.034 0.046 1.068 0.057 0.984 0.091 0.028 0.010 -0.026 0.012 0.027 0.019
R^2 0.944 R^2 0.882
11.72 -10.35Upper threshold: Lower threshold:
reer WRIR
above band below above band below
US 
Dno CA/NO
above band below above band below
Table 6.4: Threshold model estimations for the US
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Figure 6.1: Canada - Fitted versus actual values
FRANCE: CA/NO
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Figure 6.2: France - Fitted versus actual values
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GERMANY: CA/NO
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Figure 6.3: Germany - Fitted versus actual values
ITALY: CA/NO
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Figure 6.4: Italy - Fitted versus actual values
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Figure 6.5: Japan - Fitted versus actual values
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Figure 6.6: United Kingdom - Fitted versus actual values
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Figure 6.7: United States - Fitted versus actual values
In order to proceed with a test of the present-value condition (6.33), we first need
to calibrate appropriate values of the parameters a, b, c, k (i.e. of γ, μ and η) and σ,
according to the definitions in the previous section. Table 6.5 lists the parameters choices
for each country. We choose a value of 0.5 for the traded goods share in private final
consumption, a, in line with estimates by Stockman and Tesar (1995). The elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, σ, is chosen for each country to minimise the mean squared
error between the PVM predictions on the current account-net output ratio and its actual
values. Nevertheless, we select values of σ in between 0.1 and 0.55 as generally suggested
in the previous literature.36
36 See Hall(1988) and Mehra and Prescott (1985).
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a b c k ٛ
Canada 0.50 -0.568 0.407 0.983 0.20
France 0.50 0.355 0.394 0.981 0.17
Germany 0.50 0.673 0.511 0.982 0.15
Italy 0.50 0.168 0.266 0.986 0.28
Japan 0.50 -0.280 0.570 0.980 0.48
UK 0.50 0.274 0.354 0.982 0.55
US 0.50 -0.073 0.443 0.981 0.11
Calibrated Parameters
Table 6.5: List of Calibrated Parameters
6.4 Speeds of adjustment: profile bundles
In order to define the length of the variable adjustments towards steady state and thus be
able to identify a finite time window for our analysis, we look at the permanent and tem-
porary components of the variables. We refer to the nonlinear methodology by Clarida
and Taylor (2003). The authors apply the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition to nonlinear
processes. The difficulty in producing multi-step forecasts for a nonlinear process, given
the impact of future disturbances on the nonlinear function, is solved by Monte Carlo inte-
gration. We consider all possible combinations of starting values for the system variables
of±5% and their median values and then plot for each country the resulting profile bundles
of ca, q, Dno and r∗ in Figure 6.8-14 37. The different profile bundles all tend to converge
to a flat line. This fact is an indication that the long-horizon prediction of the processes
37 Due to space constraints, we report only results for these three shocks. Nevertheless, we obtain qualita-
tively equivalent results for shocks of different sizes.
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is a vector of constants38. In general, an analysis of the profile bundles suggest that most
countries converge to a finite value after 100 replications.
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Figure 6.8: Canada Profile Bundles
38 Note that, although variables are demeaned, their long run value is not necessarily zero given that the
steady state mean does not necessarily coincide with the sample one.
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Figure 6.9: France Profile Bundles
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Figure 6.10: Germany Profile Bundles
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Figure 6.11: Italy Profile Bundles
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Figure 6.12: Japan Profile Bundles
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Figure 6.13: UK Profile Bundles
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Figure 6.14: US Profile Bundles
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6.5 Predictive power of the present-value model
The predicted values of the ca variable are calculated from a finite version of equation
(6.33), where the number of forecasts ahead is set as the maximum number of periods
needed for all the system variables to flatline and all the forecasted variables are first de-
meaned of their long run mean. Results are plotted in Figures 6.15-21. Tests of the present
value model of the current account are evidently rejected given the poor fit of the predic-
tions face to the actual values As pointed out in the previous section, the low R2 of the Dno
equation seems to be the main cause of these results.
CANADA - CA/NO: Actual and Predicted Values
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1982:Q2 1983:Q4 1985:Q2 1986:Q4 1988:Q2 1989:Q4 1991:Q2 1992:Q4 1994:Q2 1995:Q4 1997:Q2 1998:Q4 2000:Q2 2001:Q4 2003:Q2
CA/NO
CA/NO predictions
Figure 6.15: Canada - Present Value Model Predictions
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FRANCE - CA/NO: Actual and Predicted Values
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Figure 6.16: France - Present Value Model Predictions
Germany - CA/NO: Actual and Predicted Values
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Figure 6.17: Germany - Present Value Model Predictions
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ITALY - CA/NO: Actual and Predicted Values
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Figure 6.18: Italy - Present Value Model Predictions
JAPAN - CA/NO: Actual and Predicted Values
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Figure 6.19: Japan - Present Value Model Predictions
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UK - CA/NO: Actual and Predicted Values
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Figure 6.20: United Kingdom - Present Value Model Predictions
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Figure 6.21: United States - Present Value Model Predictions
The present value model of the ca is rejected for all countries also once we com-
pare the variances for the actual and predicted series (reported in Table 6.6). For all G7
countries, the predicted variance is much larger than the actual one, although the existence
of a measurement error would predict exactly an opposite result. The extra volatility of
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the predicted series might be due to the inclusion of the time varying exchange rate in the
model.
Country: CA/NO Actual Data CA/NO Predicted Value
Canada 15.15 65.83
France 10.78 326.32
Germany 7.62 39.03
Italy 8.23 107.70
Japan 2.49 183.11
UK 10.44 151.29
US 3.34 14.62
Variances
Table 6.6: Variance Comparison
Engel and Rogers (2006), with reference to the US economy, also find that the dy-
namics of its current account are difficult to explain under a particular statistical model of
expectations of future US growth. Nevertheless, their results improve once actual data are
replaced by survey data on forecasted GDP growth in the G7, as a way of including in
the model all the information available to agents and therefore their resulting consumption
decisions. However, when we try to improve the fit of the predicted values by using fore-
casters’ estimations for Dno we do not significantly improve our results. We replace our
model forecasts for Dno with estimates of future GDP shares based on survey data from
Consensus Forecasts, a publication of Consensus Economics Ltd. Data are available on a
biannual basis as from 1989Q4. For brevity, we omit to report the estimation results.
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6.6 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we run a nonlinear test of the present value model of the current account. We
estimated a multivariate system for current account, net output, world real interest rate and
real exchange rate, allowing for a threshold adjustment in the current account and exchange
rate variables. We then used Monte Carlo integration methods to compute forecasts of these
variables over a finite sample, as suggested by the speed of adjustment of their temporary
components. Previous evidence on the threshold behaviour of the current account and on
the significant effect of the real exchange rate on its adjustment, as presented in the previous
chapters, seemed to support this type of methodology.
Nevertheless, in our analysis of the intertemporal model of the current account, the
predictive power of our forecasts remain highly unsatisfactory. The difficulty in modelling
the net output variable and its resulting poor fit represents the main difficulty. As an at-
tempt to overcome this obstacle, we try to replace our system forecasts by actual forecast-
ers’survey data but we obtain only a marginal improvement in the current account predic-
tions.
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6.A Appendix: Data and variable definitions
We look at quarterly data for the period 1979:1 to 2004:4. Following Chinn and Lee (2005),
we decide to estimate the US series over a shorter sample period, up to 2001Q4, in order
to avoid the substantial change in the country econometric relationship in the post-2001
period. The data in the analysis are obtained from the International Financial Statistics
Database by the IMF. All variables are seasonally adjusted and expressed in national cur-
rency. According to national account statistics, the current account variable is estimated as
the sum of net exports and net primary income from abroad (NPIA); net output is obtained
by subtracting Government consumption expenditure and gross fixed capital formation (in-
vestment) to GDP. For the exchange rate variables, we refer to trade weighted real effective
exchange rate indices, whereas a decrease in the index corresponds to a depreciation (data
are available as from 1980:1). The world real interest rate is computed as the average of the
G7 short term real interest rates, deflated by forecasts of inflation from an AR(6) process
and weighted by the time-varying share of each country GDP in the G7 total. Data on net
asset positions, used in the calibration of the b parameter in the PVM equation, are obtained
from the International Investment Position series reported in the IFS database.
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